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ERIC A. POSNER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law
A B ST R ACT. A number ofjudge-made doctrines attempt to promote international comity by
reducing possible tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns. For example,
courts usually interpret ambiguous statutes to conform to international law and understand
them not to apply outside of the nation's territorial boundaries. The international comity
doctrines are best understood as a product of a judicial judgment that in particular contexts the
costs of deference to foreign interests are lower than the benefits to American interests.
Sometimes Congress balances these considerations and incorporates its judgment in a statute,
but usually it does not. In such cases, executive interpretations should be permitted to trump the
comity doctrines, as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This conclusion is supported
both by considerations of institutional competence and by the distinctive position of the
President in the domain of foreign affairs. It follows that if the executive wants to interpret
ambiguous statutes to conflict with international law or to apply extraterritorially, it should be
permitted to do so. The analysis of the interpretive power of the executive can be justified by
reference to the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which similarly calls for deference to
executive interpretation of statutory ambiguities. Sometimes the Chevron doctrine literally
applies to executive interpretations; sometimes it operates as a valuable analogy. At the same
time, the Chevron principle is qualified by doctrines requiring a clear congressional statement,
especially when constitutionally sensitive rights are involved. These claims have many
implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored in the Hamdi
and Hamdan cases.
A U T H O R S. Eric A. Posner is Kirdand & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Cass
R. Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago. Thanks to Curt Bradley, Jacob Gersen, Jack Goldsmith, Anup Malani, Matthew
Stephenson, David Strauss, and participants at a workshop at the University of Chicago Law
School for helpful comments; to Stacey Nathan for excellent research assistance; and to Derek
Jinks and Neal Katyal for their stimulating critique.
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CHEVRONIZING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
INTRODUCTION
Federal law contains a range of international comity doctrines, developed
by judges to reduce tensions between the United States and other nations.
These doctrines instruct courts to interpret American law in a way that avoids
conflict with, or offense to, foreign sovereigns. The international comity
doctrines are a subset of what we shall call international relations doctrines-
doctrines that control how courts decide cases that influence foreign relations
but that do not always require courts to defer to the interests of foreign
sovereigns. Our modest goal here is to offer a sympathetic reconstruction of the
underpinnings of these doctrines. Our more ambitious goal is to suggest that
courts should generally draw on established principles of administrative law to
permit executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the
international relations doctrines. This approach would greatly simplify current
law; it would also allocate authority to the executive, which is in the best
position to balance the competing interests.
To understand the operation of the international relations doctrines,
consider the following problems:
(1) The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of
sex.' American businesses operating in Saudi Arabia discriminate
against female workers, some of whom are also Americans. The
workers bring suit, contending that the statute has been violated.
Under the presumption against extraterritoriality, ambiguous statutes
are not applied to conduct that occurs on foreign territory.2 It follows
that unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, the prohibition on sex
discrimination applies only within the physical boundaries of the
United States.3 The usual rationale would be to prevent offense to
Saudi Arabia. But does Saudi Arabia really care about sex
discrimination by American businesses practiced against American
employees? Even if it does, does it care enough that the discriminatory
practice should be tolerated? The executive branch, which has the best
1. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2 (2000).
a. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005).
3. Cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (involving similar facts),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. lo2-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077
(codified at 42 U.S.C. S 2ooe(f)). The actual case involved discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, and national origin.
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information about relations with Saudi Arabia, says no.4 Should courts
defer to the executive?
(2) The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain dangerous aliens who cannot be
repatriated because their home countries will not accept them.' ICE
interprets this authorization as permitting it to hold an alien convicted
of manslaughter for an indefinite period. The alien brings suit, arguing
that ICE has violated the statute, which does not speak to this particular
question. Under the Charming Betsy doctrine,6 which requires courts to
construe ambiguous statutes so as not to violate international law, the
immigration statute should be interpreted to forbid "prolonged and
arbitrary" detention in violation of non-self-executing treaties or
customary international human rights law.7 The executive branch,
which has better information about the consequences of violating
international law, argues against application of the Charming Betsy
doctrine. If we suppose that Congress has not incorporated the relevant
aspects of international law into domestic law, should courts defer to
the executive?
(3) The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally forbids
lawsuits against foreign sovereigns in American courts, but it contains a
number of exceptions, one of which permits suits when the sovereign
has expropriated property in violation of international law.8 A plaintiff
sues Austria, arguing that it expropriated artworks that belonged to her
family during and after World War II. Prior to enactment of the FSIA
in 1976, the judge-made foreign sovereign immunity doctrine did not
contain an exception for illegal expropriations. The executive branch
argues that the FSIA should not apply retroactively, fearing that
litigation would upset delicate international arrangements to provide
4. Cf. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (involving an amicus brief by
the executive in favor of applying the Americans with Disabilities Act to foreign-flagged
ships).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000).
6. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
7. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 ( 9 th Cir. 2000), vacated, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000).
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CHEVRONIZING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
compensation to victims of Nazi atrocities. Should the court accept the
interpretation of the executive branch?'
Each of these examples raises two questions. The first involves the
operation of the international relations doctrines. Why, exactly, should courts
interpret statutes to avoid extraterritorial application (as in the first example)
or the violation of international law (as in the second example)? The
conventional explanation is that otherwise foreign sovereigns would be
offended, but neither of our first two examples provides a strong case for such
a view.10 We argue that the international relations doctrines are best
understood by an account that emphasizes the costs of deferring to foreign
interests, which may be substantial, as well as the benefits. As we show,
important American interests may justify giving offense to foreign
9. Cf Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (presenting these facts). For an
argument in favor of deference to the executive's interpretation of the FSIA, with a
suggestion in favor of general deference to executive interpretations in the domain of foreign
affairs and national security, see Oren Eisner, Note, Extending Chevron Deference to
Presidential Interpretations of Ambiguities in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes
Delegating Lawmaking Power to the President, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 411 (2001). The argument
in this note is highly compatible with ours, but its focus is far narrower than our own. We
also offer a consequentialist theory of the foreign affairs doctrines and an emphasis on the
limits of the deference principle.
1o. The literature on the international comity doctrines is too large to cite here and is
overwhelmingly doctrinal and historical, not theoretical. On comity itself, see, for example,
Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991), which argues that the
discretionary use of comity is a means by which courts balance domestic and foreign
interests; and Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IowA L. REv. 893
(1998), which explores the uses and limits of comity principles. On the Charming Betsy
canon, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998), which
argues that the canon should be used by courts to determine the intent of the political
branches. On extraterritoriality, see, for example, Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 179, which objects that the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the presumption against extraterritoriality is
outdated. On the act of state doctrine, see, for example, Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among
Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907
(1992), which notes the difference in application of the doctrine to liberal and nonliberal
states and finds that liberal states sometimes are subject to more stringent evaluation; and
Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1998), which argues that courts have unnecessarily applied the doctrine broadly to
investment contracts with foreign governments. On the FSIA, see, for example, JOSEPH W.
DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 323-468 (2d ed.
2003).
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sovereigns -including, for example, the interests in vindicating laws
forbidding discrimination and protecting the environment."
The second question involves the role of the executive. When the executive
advances an interpretation of a statute that violates international comity
doctrines (the first two examples) or otherwise places a strain on the ordinary
meaning of a statute (the third example), should the executive's interpretation
be entitled to respect? This question has not yet been answered squarely by the
courts. Drawing an analogy to the administrative law doctrine of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,12 and arguing that Chevron
often applies directly, we contend that courts should generally defer to the
executive on the ground that resolving ambiguities requires judgments of
policy and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of the executive places it
in the best position to make those judgments. The exceptions here are the
standard exceptions to Chevron itself: most importantly, those that require the
national legislature to speak clearly if it seeks to raise serious constitutional
doubts. The avoidance canon is the most prominent example of a limitation on
implicit delegations of authority to the executive.
The importance of the international relations doctrines has been growing
over time -a consequence of the increasing frequency of cross-border activity
and the corresponding efforts of the U.S. government to regulate that activity.
Of course, the war on terror is a factor here, but the change is far more general.
Antitrust law can be used against foreign businesses to ensure that they do not
engage in anticompetitive practices that injure Americans.13 To say the least,
American citizens have a strong interest in freedom from sex discrimination,
but application of American law to actions in, say, Saudi Arabia might well
cause international tensions. Americans also care about whether foreign
sovereigns adequately investigate and prosecute international terrorists who
11. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to apply extraterritorially, at least to Antarctica,
even in the face of a claim that doing so would violate the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy,
No. CV-oi-o7781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (accepting a
regulation applying the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to the high seas, even outside of the
United States). But see Born Free USA v. Norton, 278 F. Supp. 2d S (D.D.C. 2003) (refusing
to apply NEPA extraterritorially to protect wild elephants in Swaziland).
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. U.S. antitrust litigation against foreign firms doing business on foreign soil has been a
significant source of international tension, as have American discovery practices. See
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 916-18 (3d ed.
20o6).
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plot on their soil but conduct operations in the United States. All of these
activities are potentially governed by the international relations doctrines.
As we shall see, the doctrines have plausible justifications. Courts are alert
to the risks of creating international tensions, and in many cases they seem to
be making a presumptive judgment that deferring to the interests of foreign
sovereigns produces benefits for Americans that outweigh the costs. For this
reason, courts have concluded that Congress must explicitly authorize
extraterritorial application of domestic law, or a violation of international law,
or any other decision that threatens international comity. But there are strong
reasons, rooted in constitutional understandings and institutional competence,
to allow the executive branch to resolve issues of international comity, at least
when the underlying statute is unclear.' 4 The executive branch can claim a
constitutional warrant for making the underlying judgments in the face of
congressional silence or ambiguity, and it is in an exceedingly good position to
balance the relevant interests.
This simple argument fits with the logic of some recent decisions,"s but it
also has radical implications, some of which are likely to be controversial. The
most obvious is that courts should play a smaller role than they currently do in
interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations. Another is that the
executive branch should be given greater power than it currently has to decide
whether the United States will violate international law. Our argument also
implies greater deference to the executive when it intervenes in private
litigation. Under our approach, the expressed will of Congress would still
14. We have been influenced by Curtis Bradley's valuable treatment of closely related questions,
his emphasis on the role of Chevron, and his argument that the Charming Betsy doctrine and
the presumption against extraterritorialiry -two of the doctrines we discuss-should not
prevail over Chevron deference. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs,
86 VA. L. REv. 649, 679 (2ooo). We also believe that Bradley correctly emphasized the
executive's superior expertise in foreign relations. But his argument and ours are different.
Our emphasis is theoretical and functional, albeit influenced by constitutional constraints;
his was predominantly doctrinal, focused on the source of law. Thus, unlike us, he argued
that Chevron deference is not appropriately applied to, for example, the act of state
doctrine-a doctrine of federal common law-"because there is no basis for presuming a
delegation of lawmaking power to the executive branch, and (unlike head-of-state
immunity, for example) these doctrines are not based on the executive branch's independent
lawmaking powers." Id. at 716. Bradley also did not try to advance a theory of the
international comity doctrines, as we do. Of course he was unable to explore either the post-
9/11 developments in this domain or the many recent developments in the law governing
judicial review of agency interpretations of law, traced below; some of these developments
complicate his argument for the use of Chevron.
is. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, S43 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (noting the
courts' "customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs").
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control, and the international relations doctrines would continue to resolve
cases in which the executive has not taken a position. In such cases, the default
assumption would follow the established doctrines; an affirmative statement
by the executive would be necessary to overcome that assumption. But if an
affirmative statement by the executive were forthcoming and its position were
reasonable, the courts would defer to the executive on whether to promote or
reject comity.
An additional implication, and an especially controversial one, is that
comity-related ambiguities in any grant of power to the President, including an
authorization to use force, should be settled by the executive, even if
international law is inconsistent with the executive's view. This claim offers
several lessons for the proper analysis of the Court's initial encounters with the
war on terror, above all in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 6 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."7 As
we shall see, the Court neglected the analogy to Chevron-a puzzling and
important omission-and an understanding of the analogy helps to provide a
significant reconstruction of the prevailing analysis in both cases.
Let us offer an important clarification before we begin. The domain of our
analysis is restricted to genuine ambiguities in governing law. If the law is
clear, the executive is bound by it, and this point holds for international law
that is the result of self-executing treaties or that has been given domestic effect
by congressional action. Nothing in our argument suggests that the executive
may violate the law as enacted by Congress. It is because statutes are often
unclear that our argument, no less than Chevron itself, should have broad
implications.
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DOCTRINES
Over a period of many years, courts have adopted numerous rules for
litigation that touch on the interests of foreign sovereigns or their citizens.
These rules apply only in the absence of congressional guidance; the national
legislature is permitted to settle the underlying questions as it chooses. While
most of these doctrines are specifically designed to promote comity, others
must be justified in different terms because they promote American interests at
the expense of comity.
16. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
17. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (20o6).
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A. Comity Doctrines
The Charming Betsy canon. This canon provides that an ambiguous statute
will be interpreted to avoid conflicts with international law. Return to one of
the cases with which we began: an ambiguous law that permits ICE to detain
an alien who cannot be repatriated will not be interpreted as permitting
indefinite detention, because such detention would violate the prohibition of
"prolonged and arbitrary" detention in international law. 8 Note that the
Charming Betsy canon does not apply to statutes that are clear; if a statute
unambiguously conflicts with international law, international law is
superseded and deprived of domestic effect. And if international law is
incorporated in domestic law, there is no need for the Charming Betsy canon;
domestic law, by hypothesis, already includes international law.
Extraterritoriality. The presumption against extraterritoriality provides that
an ambiguous statute will be interpreted not to apply to conduct outside the
United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not explicitly state whether it
applies abroad or not; it was therefore interpreted not to apply to
discriminatory behavior of American businesses located in Saudi Arabia.' 9
Act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine provides that a court may not
evaluate the act of another state that takes place within its own territory.
Shortly after the Cuban revolution, the Cuban government expropriated sugar
that belonged to an American company. Another firm entered a contract with
Cuba for the sugar but refused to pay for it after the sugar was delivered,
fearing that it might be liable to the victim of expropriation. Cuba sued the
buyer in an American court, and the buyer defended itself by arguing that
Cuba did not have clear title to the sugar because the expropriation was illegal.
Under the act of state doctrine, the court could not accept this argument
18. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). The canon gets its name from Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), which interpreted a statute
prohibiting trade with France as inapplicable to a citizen of a neutral state in order to avoid
violating the international law of neutrality.
19. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. lO2-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe(f) (2000)). We note below some complexities in this decision and the surrounding
doctrine. NEPA, which is silent on the question of extraterritorial application, has similarly
been held not to apply abroad and hence not, for example, to require an environmental
impact statement for U.S. military installations in Japan. See NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin,
837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993).
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because it would have involved an evaluation of Cuba's conduct; it had to
assume that Cuba's tide was valid.20
Foreign sovereign immunity. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which grants foreign
sovereigns immunity from liability for violating the law.2' The rule was relaxed
in the twentieth century, mainly in cases involving a commercial defendant
owned by a foreign sovereign.2" In 1976, the doctrine was codified in the
FSIA."3 The statute contains some new exceptions-for example, it denies
immunity to state sponsors of terrorism.' A related doctrine provides
immunity to heads of state.2"
Comity in general. Case law equivocates between calling international
comity a value and a rule. As a value, it reflects the sense that cases affecting
foreign interests should be decided in a manner that accounts for these
interests in some way- hence our reference to "international comity doctrines"
in general. Courts also sometimes cite international comity as an explanation
for outcomes that are not explicitly driven by the doctrines we have discussed,
and here comity is sometimes treated as a rule. For example, the Supreme
Court cited international comity in explaining why courts should defer to the
judgments of international arbitrators employed to resolve international
contractual disputes. 6 In a recent case, Justice Breyer cited concerns about
international comity to explain his uneasiness with applying the Alien Tort
Statute to litigation in which both parties were aliens and the tortious conduct
took place on foreign territory.27 Courts also appeal to international comity to
justify staying litigation in the United States when parallel litigation is ongoing
in foreign countries.
2o. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-32 (1964), superseded by statute,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000)).
21. See The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
22. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983).
23. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Star. 2891 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §5 1330, 1602-1611 (2000)).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(7).
25. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F. 3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004).
a6. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985)
(holding that antitrust claims were properly arbitrated under the Federal Arbitration Act).
27. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
28. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kozeny, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1250 (D. Colo. 2o00)
(granting a stay of proceedings while litigation proceeded in London).
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Taken as a whole, this body of doctrines implies that courts should take
seriously the interests of foreign sovereigns as offering interpretive guidance
when domestic statutes are silent or ambiguous on the issues and even
sometimes when domestic statutes are fairly clear. An American court might
offend foreign sovereigns by violating international law that reflects their
interests, by interfering with their regulation of activities on their territory, by
taking cases in the resolution of which they have a strong interest, by
evaluating their activities, or by issuing judgments against them.
B. Anti-Comity Doctrines
Some international relations doctrines do not promote comity at all. On the
contrary, they advance American interests at the expense of foreign interests.
We call these the "anti-comity doctrines."
The revenue rule. The revenue rule provides that an American court will not
enforce a tax judgment of another nation. 9 Suppose that a Canadian or
American citizen fails to pay taxes in Canada. The taxpayer flees to the United
States, and the Canadian government brings suit in an American court, asking
the court to enforce the Canadian tax law or a judgment based on it. The
revenue rule prohibits the American court from enforcing the Canadian tax law
or judgment. Note that the revenue rule is rooted in state rather than federal
law; it has not been overridden at the national level and in that sense has
received national acquiescence over time.
The penal rule. Under the penal rule, an American court may not enforce a
foreign criminal judgment." By contrast, an American court is generally
supposed to enforce other types of judgments-for example, those resulting
from breach of contract or tort-unless there are public policy reasons not to
do so." It should be clear that the revenue and penal rules do not show much
respect for the interests of a foreign state. The penal rule, like the revenue rule,
is rooted in state rather than federal law.32
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483
(1987) ("Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments
for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.").
30. See id.
pi. See id. §§ 481-482.
32. The revenue and penal rules are sometimes said to be examples of a more general "public
law taboo" against enforcing foreign public law or foreign judgments based on foreign
public law in domestic courts. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (2002); Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in
Internal Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255 (i99). Public law includes antitrust law,
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Public policy exceptions to enforcement of foreign law and judgments. Standard
choice of law rules also contain a significant exception for judgments and laws
that violate American public policy. American courts refuse to enforce
judgments of countries that have corrupt or ineffective legal systems.33 They
have also refused to enforce foreign laws that offend American values or
sensibilities - most notably British libel law, which is less protective of
expression than the First Amendment would require.34 It follows that American
courts will not uphold judgments against defendants under British libel law,
even if ordinary conflicts principles would otherwise call for deference.
These anti-comity doctrines assert American interests in the context of
international relations, potentially or actually at the expense of the interests of
other countries. These doctrines are, to be sure, rules of state law, while the
comity doctrines are rules of federal law; nonetheless, the anti-comity doctrines
do determine legal outcomes, and they are applied by federal courts in diversity
cases and in federal question cases involving state law predicates. As we shall
now see, the existence of doctrines that jeopardize comity casts the
international relations doctrines in a distinctive light.
II. BEHIND THE DOCTRINES
What underlies these various doctrines? To answer this question, we take
the comity and anti-comity doctrines together because both are designed to
sort out the relationship between international relations and domestic law.
It is tempting to suggest that the doctrines track Congress's own
intentions, on the theory that Congress ordinarily expects and hopes that the
law will be interpreted in the way indicated by the doctrines. But this
explanation seems highly artificial. Congress frequently enacts statutes that
violate international law, apply extraterritorially, or otherwise ignore notions of
securities law, and so forth, not just tax and criminal law. The public law taboo has been
breaking down but still remains strong. See McConnaughay, supra, at 256-57.
33. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3 d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting "chaos" in
Liberian courts); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F. 3d 14o6, 1412 ( 9 th Cir. 1995) (noting that
strong anti-American bias, politicization, and secrecy in Iranian courts precluded the
possibility of a fair and impartial tribunal); Choi v. Kim, 5o F.3 d 244, 248-50 (3 d Cir. 1995)
(holding that lack of notice of a South Korean property order violated due process).
34. See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding
that enforcement of a judgment under British libel law violated U.S. public policy because of
the conflict with First Amendment protections).
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comity.3" Perhaps Congress's failure to take these steps explicitly signals its
acceptance of the outcomes produced by the comity doctrines. But when a
statute is silent about these issues, Congress is most unlikely to have had any
intentions or even to have thought about the question at all.
On an alternative view, the doctrines track congressional intentions only in
the sense that they provide the background against which Congress legislates. 6
To the extent that some of the doctrines are clear and firm-consider the
presumption against extraterritoriality-Congress might be assumed to want
them to apply unless it directs otherwise. In a sense, the doctrines are
incorporated by reference. As with the canon against retroactivity,3 7 so too with
the comity doctrines: they are part of the fabric of existing law, and Congress is
best taken to endorse them unless it expressly displaces them.
In our view, this position also suffers from a lack of realism. It is true that
the doctrines are part of the "background" in the sense that they are invoked by
courts in the face of congressional silence. But is it plausible to say that
Congress, as such, should be charged with endorsing them, or even with
knowing what they are? Perhaps particular legislators and members of relevant
interest groups are aware of the doctrines. But there is a large distance between
acknowledging this possibility and suggesting that Congress should be
understood to have endorsed the doctrines as part of the background against
which it does its work. The real basis for the international relations doctrines
must be normative; it must be that they ought to be taken as part of the
legislative background, not that Congress does so take them.
A common explanation for international comity doctrines is that they avoid
unnecessary entanglements with foreign states.38 We now evaluate this
3S. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301, 78 Stat. lOO9, 1013 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000)) (establishing that the act of state doctrine
shall not be used to decline jurisdiction over property confiscations violating international
law after January 1, 1959); Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 11o Stat. 785 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6o91 (2000)) (penalizing foreign firms that do business with
Cuba).
36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Star. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 200oe(f) (2000)); NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993)
(assuming that Congress legislates with awareness of the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
37. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
38. See Duncan Hollis, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 881, 885
(2005) (citing Justice Scalia's interpretation of comity as a means of preventing foreign
conflict); Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial
Comity: Two Illustrations Using Trans-National Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L.
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conventional wisdom, which we call the "entanglement theory." We argue that
it is inferior to a broader theory, which we call the "consequentialist theory"
because it identifies other important consequences in addition to that of
entanglement.3 9 This theory, we suggest, helps explain those principles that
require a clear congressional statement.40 Offering a justification for the
international relations doctrines is one of our central goals, but as we shall see
the argument for deference to executive interpretations follows on either
account.
A. Entanglement
The entanglement theory suggests that international comity doctrines
reduce the risk that courts will inadvertendy cause foreign policy tensions or
crises by offending other nations. The act of state doctrine prevents courts
from angering foreign sovereigns by expressing disapproval of their sovereign
acts.4' The FSJA similarly prevents courts from declaring that a foreign
sovereign has violated an American law, an action that the foreign government
might regard as an insult to its sovereignty. The presumption against
extraterritoriality prevents courts from interfering with the ability of foreign
governments to regulate activity on their own soil. 42 The common theme is
REV. 591 (2001) (arguing that comity helps to minimize conflicts with foreign courts);
Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and
Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982) (suggesting that courts invoke comity
to preserve international relations and to encourage efficiency in the resolution of disputes
through discretionary cooperation).
39. It is of course possible to imagine other theories, especially for particular doctrines. The
presumption against extraterritoriality, for example, might be defended on the specific
ground that nations should have exclusive authority over conduct that occurs within their
territories. We explore the entanglement theory and the consequentialist alternative not
because they exhaust the field but because the former is widely held and the latter seems
capacious enough to capture the relevant considerations.
40. Some doctrines may reflect other considerations as well. For example, the presumption
against extraterritoriality may reflect a judgment that the costs of enforcement overseas are
very high. We bracket these considerations.
41. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964), superseded by statute,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (2000)).
42. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004) ("This rule
of statutory construction cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby
helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony-a
harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent commercial world."); EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
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that a court might inadvertently increase international tensions or, in the
extreme case, even provoke an international crisis by offending or injuring a
foreign nation. That nation might then retaliate against the United States, for
example, by withdrawing its participation in a vital area of international
cooperation or directing its own courts to commit similar offenses against the
United States.
To be sure, the comity doctrines are default rules only; courts will not
interfere with a legislative determination that America's interests are advanced
despite (or because of) the international conflict. But because, all else equal,
foreign conflict is undesirable, courts will assume that it does not serve
America's interests unless Congress explicitly says otherwise.
In our view, the theory is superficially attractive but ultimately
unpersuasive. The problem with the theory is that it identifies the benefits of
deferring to foreign sovereigns (avoiding offense, retaliation, and conflict), but
it does not account for the costs of deferring to foreign sovereigns (preventing
the United States from advancing its interests, including protecting American
citizens from discrimination or preventing the loss of endangered species or
some other kind of serious environmental harm).
In addition, the entanglement explanation for comity rules cannot be
reconciled with the existence of anti-comity rules, which ignore foreign
interests. For example, the public policy exception to choice of law rules
permits a court to refuse to enforce a foreign judgment or foreign law if doing
so would violate American public policy. In order to apply this rule, the court
must evaluate the sovereign act of a foreign country against American policies.
The Charming Betsy canon requires courts to determine what international law
is, and such a determination will often require a court to evaluate the acts of
foreign states- for example, whether or not they have really acted consistently
with a norm of customary international law.
None of this means that the avoidance of foreign entanglements plays no
role in existing doctrine. As we have noted, a foreign entanglement- more
accurately, causing offense to a foreign state -is a real cost. Gratuitous tensions
with other nations should certainly be avoided. But sometimes tensions are not
gratuitous, and the use of the comity principles can inflict harm on legitimate
American interests as well. The failure to apply antitrust laws,
antidiscrimination laws, or environmental laws overseas may mean injury to
American citizens. Perhaps some of the doctrines represent a categorical
judgment that the risk of international tension outweighs that injury, at least
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1o77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200oe(f)
(2000)).
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enough to require a clear statement from Congress. But an analysis of this sort
leads in directions that the entanglement theory, standing by itself, cannot
explain.
In sum, the problems with the entanglement theory are that entanglements
are not always bad; that the theory provides no basis for distinguishing good
or tolerable entanglements from bad entanglements; and, most importantly,
that the theory says nothing about the benefits for American interests that
might outweigh the cost of entanglements. A better theory would explain why
courts sometimes defer to foreign interests because of the risk of entanglement
and sometimes refuse to defer to such interests despite the risk of
entanglement.
B. Consequences and Reciprocity
A more complete explanation is that courts defer to foreign sovereigns after
a rough assessment of the consequences. Deference occurs when courts believe
that the benefits exceed the costs. With this formulation, we do not mean a
formal cost-benefit analysis; rather, the doctrines are best understood as rooted
in an all-things-considered assessment of consequences, which importantly
include the legitimacy and strength of the American interests.
1. Consequences in General
The most obvious costs of deference include the loss of American control
over activities the regulation of which would promote American interests -not
simply those of the United States as sovereign but also those of American
citizens. The benefits include reciprocal gains from foreign states' deference to
American regulation, as well as the reduced likelihood of causing international
tensions that could ultimately hurt American interests. For some of the
international relations principles, there might be other benefits, including, in
the context of the Charming Betsy canon, a general strengthening of the system
of international law. If respect for international law promotes cooperation and
preserves long-term commitments, it might be best to assume that ambiguous
statutes fit with international law. Thus, courts should consider at least three
factors when resolving cases with foreign relations implications: (i) an
empirical determination or conjecture (a) that the foreign state is likely to
reciprocate or (b) that it would otherwise retaliate in some way if the court
ignored its interests; (2) a judgment that the benefits of reciprocation or
nonretaliation by foreign states exceed the costs of deference to the foreign
interests; and (3) an additional judgment about whether deference has
systemic or rule of law benefits or disadvantages for the United States. In our
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view, intuitive judgments with respect to (1), (2), and (3) help to explain the
operation of the international relations doctrines and some incongruities as
well. Our goal in this Subsection is to defend this claim, both as a way of
understanding the doctrines and as a general preface to the inquiry into
executive authority to displace them. We believe that all of the doctrines could
be plausibly supported in this way; we offer several examples by way of
illustration.
Consider first the penal rule. The cost of deference to a foreign criminal
judgment is that the American court may end up imposing a sanction on a
person on account of a crime that the United States does not recognize as
serious or on account of a criminal conviction that emerged from procedures
that the United States does not recognize as just. If the defendant is not an
American citizen, that cost might not be deemed especially large, but surely the
United States is interested in avoiding the use of its courts to collaborate in
injustice. If the defendant is an American citizen, then the cost will be that
much larger. The benefit of deference is that if foreign states reciprocate,
people convicted in American courts who flee to foreign jurisdictions will be
forced to pay the American penalty; thus American criminal enforcement is
strengthened. The penal rule is best understood as reflecting American
uneasiness with foreign criminal procedures, in which traditional American
criminal protections against unjust convictions, including the jury, are often
absent.43 To avoid enforcing foreign convictions, the United States is willing to
give up enforcement of American convictions abroad. Other nations appear to
hold similar views.' Indeed, extraterritorial enforcement of criminal law
occurs mainly through elaborate extradition treaties, which usually ensure that
the acts in question are criminal in both states and which contain numerous
other protections.4"
Now consider the choice of law rules. In this context, the consequentialist
analysis plausibly yields a different outcome. Enforcing foreign civil judgments
does not greatly offend American notions of justice because we have lower
standards for civil procedure than for criminal procedure and our standards are
not that different from those of other major liberal democracies. Enforcing
such judgments also promotes trade and investment, especially if foreign
sovereigns enforce American judgments as well. But when the civil laws of
43. This point is made explicitly in Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005).
44. See Dodge, supra note 32, at 193-2o8 (discussing U.S. and foreign law and treaties).
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475
(1987).
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other countries do offend American public policy, the laws and judgments are
not enforced.
The act of state doctrine requires U.S. courts to treat the acts of foreign
sovereigns within their own territory as valid. 6 Putting the public policy
doctrine and the act of state doctrine together, we can see that American courts
implicitly presume that foreign states have a greater interest in regulating
activity that takes place within their territory and a weaker interest in
regulating activity on American territory. This presumption seems entirely
reasonable. As long as other states behave similarly, the American courts ensure
that the United States obtains the reciprocal benefit of control over its own
territory in return for deference to foreign regulation of activities on foreign
territory.
This fundamental idea-that states regulate activities on their own
territories and thus have little or no power over the activities that occur in
foreign states-plainly underlies the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The United States gains from this rule insofar as it avoids interference with its
domestic regulation but loses from this rule insofar as it is prevented from
regulating activities, such as race and sex discrimination, on foreign soil. All in
all, the rule plausibly creates a net benefit. The United States generally has little
interest in what occurs on foreign soil, and other states have little interest in
what occurs on American soil. As we have noted, there are significant
exceptions, but the overall assessment is fairly clear. Hence the presumption
applies, subject to congressional override.47
Finally, the Charming Betsy canon reflects the consequentialist calculus in a
particularly straightforward way. For the most part, states join international
treaties and consent to customary international law when it is in their interest
to do so.48 Thus, international law already reflects the outcome of a
46. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398, superseded by statute, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.
47. For an argument in favor of extraterritorial application of antitrust and securities laws, on
the grounds that judges are bad at balancing and that it is preferable for the government to
negotiate treaties with foreign states that object to the laws, see Russell J. Weintraub, The
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a
"Choice-of-Law" Approach, 7o TEx. L. REV. 1799 (1992). For a somewhat related argument,
see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflia-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1Ol (1998). As we note below, we favor rules if decision
costs are high; whether the rule should be in favor of extraterritorial application or against it
depends on the costs and benefits, which are best assessed by the executive in the face of
legislative silence or ambiguity.
48. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43
(2o05) (discussing the literature). There are some narrow, controversial exceptions to this
general proposition, such asjus cogens norms.
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consequentialist calculus. A particular rule benefits the United States by
constraining the activity of other states but hurts the United States by
constraining it; nonetheless, the political branches believe on balance that the
rule provides a net benefit for the United States. If Congress then passes a
statute that violates international law, states protected by that law may retaliate
against the U.S. government. It is reasonable to assume that the cost of
potential retaliation exceeds the benefit of the new legislation, given that the
U.S. government would only consent to a treaty in the first place because it
believed that the benefits from international cooperation would exceed the
costs, including the cost of refraining from future legislation inconsistent with
the treaty. There is also a possibility that the United States may obtain a variety
of long-term benefits from complying with international law. Of course, in any
given case, the costs and benefits may have changed; that is why Congress is
permitted to pass laws that violate international law as long as its enactments
are sufficiently clear. 49
On the other side, the revenue rule provides a potential counterexample to
our thesis. It seems doubtful at first sight that enforcement of foreign tax
judgments would routinely violate important constitutional and common law
norms in the way that enforcement of foreign criminal judgments would.
Thus, the case for the revenue rule is weaker than the case for the penal rule.
Indeed, one might argue that the revenue rule should be folded into the
standard choice of law analysis, under which foreign judgments are evaluated
on a case-by-case basis and rejected only if the judgment, or the legal system
that produced the judgment, violates American public policy. 0
This argument was addressed in recent years by the Second Circuit in
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.sl While the
court recognized the force of the criticisms of the revenue rule, it ended up
strongly endorsing the rule. The court's most interesting reason was that, as a
matter of historical fact, the U.S. government and nearly every foreign
government have strong reservations about enforcing the tax judgments of
foreign nations. In the court's view, the bright-line revenue rule does reflect a
balancing of costs and benefits. The costs of enforcing foreign tax judgments
are high because these judgments are often harsh and unfair. The benefits are
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115()(a).
so. Many scholars have taken this position. See, e.g., William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign
Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HouS. J. INT'L L. 265,
277-78 (2000).
51. 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2OOl).
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zero if, as the court hinted, other states are not willing to enforce American tax
judgments. 2
2. Rules and Standards
There is an interesting question why courts are willing to take a case-by-
case approach to foreign contract and tort judgments and not to foreign tax
judgments. It is not clear that any post hoc account adequately explains the
current situation. Perhaps the best answer is that while nations tend to enforce
contracts and punish torts in roughly the same way, they take widely varying
approaches to taxation; thus, courts have more confidence in evaluating the
first type of case than the second. As recognized by R.J. Reynolds, the political
branches appear to have concluded that objectionable foreign tax judgments
are common enough, and the likelihood of foreign enforcement of American
tax judgments is small enough, that case-by-case evaluation is not necessary.
When decision costs are high, rules are better than standards. The benefits of
the revenue rule exceed the costs, and the courts defer to the political branches'
judgment.s3
This discussion of the revenue rule should make clear that the
rule/standard dimension is orthogonal to the question of the best account of
the international relations rules. Many of the current doctrines are general
S2. Id. at 115 (noting that enforcement of tax judgments is usually a matter of treaty). Moreover,
to the extent that U.S. taxes are lower than foreign taxes, the U.S. treasury loses less from
nonenforcement of American tax judgments against foreign persons than Americans would
lose from enforcement of foreign tax judgments against them. We suspect that this kind of
imbalance may explain the inability of states to enter strict tax treaties -one state's taxes will
always be lower than another state's - but we have not found evidence for this view.
We should add that the idea that the revenue and penal rules -and more broadly the
"public law taboo" - are based on the idea of reciprocity is an old one. In particular, there is a
longstanding view that if American judges enforced foreign public law, this would deprive
the American government of bargaining power as it tried to persuade other governments to
enforce American judgments by treaty. See F.A. Mann, The International Enforcement of Public
Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603, 608-09 (1987). For a recent argument to this effect,
see Dodge, supra note 32, at 224-26. However, we disagree with William Dodge's additional
argument in favor of an exception for private plaintiffs: "Fairness demands that the interests
of private parties seeking to enforce foreign law not be held hostage to the government's
interest in promoting reciprocity .... Id. at 230. The problem with this argument is that
fairness cuts both ways; legitimate individual interests are on both sides. By the logic of
Dodge's own argument, the only way to prevent unfairness to American plaintiffs in foreign
courts is to deprive foreign plaintiffs of judgments in American courts, so that the U.S.
government has leverage for effecting change by treaty.
53. The RJ. Reynolds court did, to be sure, cite the entanglement theory as well. 268 F.3d at 111-
13.
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rules, reflecting aggregate judgments. The penal and revenue rules are "rules,"
as are the provisions of the FSIA. Other doctrines operate more clearly as
standards. Consider the public policy exception to the choice of law rules.
Operating case by case, courts evaluate foreign law and then respect or reject it
by asking whether it is consistent with American public policy. For example,
when American courts decide whether to enforce foreign civil judgments, they
make an overall evaluation of the quality of the foreign state's judicial system. 4
The implicit assumption appears to be that decision costs are lower when
courts evaluate foreign civil legal systems than when they evaluate foreign
criminal law or tax systems. The choice between rules and standards reflects
some assessment of decision costs and error costs, and we take no position on
whether existing international relations doctrines are insufficiently or
excessively rule-like."5
Putting aside the rules/standards issue, we propose that the
consequentialist theory supplies the most plausible and general account of the
international relations doctrines. The doctrines operate in a way that seems to
fit with the theory, and the theory helps explain the fact that courts are
sometimes willing to endanger comity. Of course it is possible to question
whether the consequentialist assessment has been properly made, in general or
in particular cases. Behind the rhetoric, many of the existing disputes are about
exactly that question.
C. Questions and Doubts
Notwithstanding the plausibility of the consequentialist understanding, its
fragility should be immediately apparent. The first objection is that most of the
time, courts lack good tools to make the relevant judgments. Recall that it is
important for judges to make a variety of judgments, involving, for example,
the risk of retaliation and the benefits of reciprocation. Perhaps some cases are
54. Compare Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (0oth Cir. 2005) (noting that English
and American court procedures are substantially similar and that the English system is fair),
with Choi v. Kim, 5o F. 3d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that lack of notice of a South
Korean property order violated due process).
55. Jack Goldsmith has argued in favor of rules, on the ground that standards provide courts
with too much discretion to affect foreign relations. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395 (1999). The
argument implicitly assumes that the decision costs in foreign relations cases are high,
which is plausible, but does not address the question of the content of the rules. For
example, should they generally direct courts to avoid offending foreign sovereigns (like
sovereign immunity) or to advance American interests (like the penal rule)? In any case, the
executive, as we shall see, is in the best position to decide between rules and standards.
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easy, but many are difficult. It may well be that in the face of statutory
ambiguity, courts have no choice but to rely on presumptions. To the extent
that statutes are in equipoise, the international relations doctrines may well be
a sensible way to proceed. The doctrines are harder to defend if they operate
not merely as presumptions but as clear statement principles, defeating the
more likely interpretation of the statute.
A second objection to the consequentialist theory is that courts do not insist
as much on reciprocity as the theory might suggest. The evidence here is
mixed. In many cases, courts mention and appear to place weight on the fact
that the foreign nation in question defers in the same manner that the courts
are urged to do. 6 But in other cases, courts do not discuss the actions of the
foreign state and even reject the notion that reciprocity matters. s7 Perhaps the
threat of some other kind of retaliation is a significant motivation. The
problem may be that courts simply have no way to determine whether the
foreign state will reciprocate or retaliate, and thus they fall back on crude
presumptions that respect comity in some cases (e.g., extraterritorial
application of statutes) and not in others (e.g., enforcement of penal
judgments).
Whatever the truth, we have trouble seeing a normative justification for
many applications of the doctrines when the other state does not reciprocate
and when the risk of retaliation is trivial. For example, it is unclear why the
United States should not apply its law to acts of sex discrimination by an
American company against American workers abroad if foreign states are
indifferent. To be sure, often larger international law values may be at stake;
we do not mean to suggest that possible damage to these values should be
ignored. Our claim is only that this possible damage should be taken into
account in the consequentialist balancing.
56. See Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d lOOO, 1004-o6 (5th Cir. 199 o )
(exercising discretion not to recognize an Emirati judgment because of a lack of reciprocity);
Ad. Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179,183 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (giving full faith
and credit to the decree of a Costa Rican court because Costa Rican courts give full faith and
credit to the decrees of foreign courts), affid, 553 F.2d OO9 (5th Cir. 1977). More generally,
see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895), a seminal Supreme Court case on international
comity, which required reciprocity.
57. See Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 691 n.7 (7 th Cir. 1987) (observing
that a state statute rejected the requirement of reciprocity); see also UNIF. FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS ACT §5 2-3, 13 U.L.A. 16o, 163-234 (2002) (providing for the enforcement of
foreign judgments without requiring reciprocity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481, reporters' note 1 (1987) (discussing cases on
both sides, but concluding that reciprocity is not required); Paul, supra note lo, at 49
(arguing that courts do not determine whether the foreign sovereign reciprocates).
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A more general question, signaled by these various questions, involves the
position of the executive.
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
In our view, the executive should usually be permitted to interpret
statutory ambiguities so as to defeat the international relations principles. It
would follow, for example, that the executive should be permitted to construe
the civil rights statutes or the National Environmental Policy Act to apply
extraterritorially. Moreover, the constitutional position of the President in the
domain of foreign affairs strongly supports this conclusion. But to understand
these claims, one must back up a bit.
A. The Chevron Doctrine
i. Two Steps
Outside of the context of foreign affairs, the argument for executive
authority should be familiar, for courts regularly defer to executive
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. The central idea is most
famously associated with Chevron, in which the Supreme Court created a two-
step inquiry for assessing executive interpretations of law. The first inquiry is
whether Congress has directly decided the precise question at issue.' 8 If not,
the second inquiry is whether the agency's decision is "permissible" in the
sense that it is reasonable.5 9
In defending this approach, the Court referred to two points about
institutional competence: as compared with executive agencies, judges lack
expertise and are not politically accountable. Technical specialization was
relevant to the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, and there the executive had
conspicuous advantages over courts.60 Moreover, in interpreting law, the
agency could "properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to
the people, the Chief Executive is . ,6" In the Court's view, it would be
appropriate for agencies, rather than judges, to assess "competing interests
S8. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
sg. Id.
60. See id. at 865.
61. Id.
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which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved.., in light of everyday realities.
'
,
62
What is most striking about this passage, and most relevant for present
purposes, is the suggestion that resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a
judgment about how to assess "competing interests." This is a candid
recognition that assessments of policy are sometimes indispensable to statutory
interpretation- a point with particular importance in the context of relations
with other nations. Of course we can imagine cases in which courts resolve
ambiguities through the standard sources -for example, by using dictionaries,
consulting statutory structure, deploying canons of construction, or relying on
legislative history. Under Chevron Step One, the executive will lose if the
standard sources show that it is wrong.6 But sometimes those sources will
leave gaps; Chevron itself is such a case, and there are many others. If the
Court's analysis is accepted on this point, its deference principle seems readily
understandable; we shall shortly investigate its relationship to the international
relations doctrines.
It is an understatement to say that the foundations of the Chevron approach
have been disputed. 6' But the Supreme Court has settled on a specific
understanding of those foundations: courts defer to agency interpretations of
law when and because Congress has told them to do so. 6, On this view, the
deference principle is a reading of legislative instructions; hence, Congress has
ultimate control over the deference question. The problem is that Congress
hardly ever states its instructions on the deference question with clarity, and
thus Chevron cannot be grounded on an explicit or implicit legislative
instruction on that question. It follows that Chevron rests on a legal fiction, 66 to
the effect that a grant of the authority to make rules and conduct adjudications,
and perhaps other authority as well,67 also carries with it interpretive power.
62. Id. at 865-66.
63. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). To the extent that the
international relations canons operate as part of Step One, they trump executive power
under Chevron- a proposition on which we shall cast some doubt. See infra Section III.C.
64. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988).
65. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-18 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., s33 U.S.
218, 227 (2001).
66. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986); Antonin Scalia,Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
67. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
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2. Limits on Deference
Chevron grants a great deal of power to the executive. Nonetheless, the
deference principle is not unlimited. For our purposes, three limitations have
particular importance.
a. Delegated Power ofInterpretation?
It is possible that the executive will not receive Chevron deference if the
agency has not exercised delegated power to make rules or to undertake
adjudications.68 It follows that if Congress has not given the relevant agency
rulemaking or adjudicatory power, or if the agency, while delegated that
power, has not exercised it in interpreting the law, the ordinary level of
deference may be unavailable.6 9
In this way, administrative law principles make it important to distinguish
the various procedures that precede executive interpretation. At one end of the
spectrum is the rulemaking or adjudicative procedure that produces an
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Interpretations produced by
rulemaking or adjudication receive Chevron deference.7 0 Agency interpretations
that emerge from policy statements or interpretive rules are often not entitled
to Chevron deference, but they do receive a measure of respect under United
States v. Mead Corp."1 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 2
By contrast, litigation positions -whereby the executive asserts a particular
interpretation for the first time in litigation in which the executive is a party or
an amicus -receive no deference at all, apparently on the theory that Congress
would not want courts to defer to positions that may be opportunistic and that
are not preceded by any kind of check on possible arbitrariness.73 The refusal to
68. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
69. We use the word "may" because the doctrine is complicated. See, e.g., Barnhart, 535 U.S. at
222 (holding that longstanding agency interpretations can be entitled to deference even if
they were not promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking).
70. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
71. 533 U.S. at 227-28.
72. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
73. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (holding that the
EEOC's litigation position contradicted its earlier stance, was not supported by adequate
evidence, and therefore was not entitled to deference), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 5 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(f)
(2000)); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (giving no deference
to a litigation position). As we suggest infra text accompanying note iii, litigation positions
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defer to litigation positions is plausible in general. But it may well be
inapplicable in the foreign relations setting because the pressure of events may
prevent the executive branch from setting policy through formal procedures or
in advance. We return to this point below.74
b. Nondelegation Canons?
Courts have sometimes denied the executive law-interpreting authority on
the ground that key decisions must be explicidy made by the national
lawmaker. The most important principle, of evident relevance to our argument
here, is the avoidance canon, captured in the claim that the executive is not
permitted to construe statutes so as to raise serious constitutional doubts.75
Why does the avoidance canon overcome the executive's power of
interpretation? The reason is that we are speaking of a kind of nondelegation
canon-one that attempts to require Congress to make its instructions
exceedingly clear and that does not permit the executive to make
constitutionally sensitive decisions on its own. 76 The idea of avoidance affects
the executive branch in particular because it forbids that branch to construe
ambiguous statutes so as to raise serious constitutional problems; Congress, by
contrast, is permitted to create constitutionally sensitive policy by law if it
explicitly chooses. The avoidance canon requires the national legislature, and it
alone, to raise hard constitutional questions.
Other interpretive principles, such as the canon against retroactivity,7 also
serve as nondelegation canons that deny deference and trump Chevron.78 The
canon against retroactivity, for example, ensures that the executive will not be
taken to have been delegated the power to apply statutes retroactively.
Congress alone must make that decision. In areas ranging from broadcasting to
receive no deference, but some decisions suggest that Chevron deference may still be
available when the interpretation is not a product of rulemaking or adjudication. The word
"may" is crucial. See supra note 69.
74- See infra Subsection II.E.3.
75. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001);
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988).
76. One of us discusses this idea more generally in Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67
U. CHI. L. REv. 315 (2000).
7. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 2o8.
78. See, e.g., Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992).
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the war on terror, 79 the nondelegation canons constrain the interpretive
discretion of the executive.
c. Organic Statutes and Others
Under administrative law principles, it is also important to distinguish
among categories of statutes. The first category includes statutes that authorize
agency action (sometimes called "organic" statutes). Agencies are entitled to
deference at least insofar as they are interpreting a statute that grants them
rulemaking and adjudicatory power. The second category includes more
general statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)80 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8' which merely regulate agency behavior.
According to standard principles, agencies are not entitled to deference in the
interpretation of such statutes. 2
It is not entirely clear how to adapt this distinction to the domain of
international relations, but it seems to make sense to distinguish between two
categories of statutes. The first category includes statutes that give the
executive the authority to implement policy through rulemaking or
adjudication. Such statutes seem to fall comfortably within the basic
framework of Chevron. Arguable examples include the statute that provides the
President with authority to regulate immigration8 ' and the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) .84 It is less clear how to approach statutes that
apply regardless of the cause of action or type of enforcement, even to common
law litigation. Such laws include the FSIA and the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act.8 ' Laws of this kind are indeed general, and it
would be possible to see them as akin to FOJA and the APA. Yet these laws also
delegate authority to the executive, and perhaps they should not be treated the
same as those statutes that generally limit executive authority.
79. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047 (2005) (exploring the role of international law and canons
of construction in the interpretation of the Authorization for Use of Military Force).
SO. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
81. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Star. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
82. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 208-09 (2006).
83. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (applying Chevron deference to
an immigration statute).
84. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. 2002)).
85. 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986).
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The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 86 which played an
important role in Hamdan,8 7 might well be classed with FOLA and the APA as a
general provision that regulates the executive branch, rather than as a statute
that the executive is charged with implementing. The War Powers
Resolution,88 which limits the President's power to use military force, is a more
straightforward example; it would be difficult to argue that the executive is
entrusted with the power to interpret its textual ambiguities. Reasonable
people can disagree about the proper categorization of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).89 Perhaps it is best seen as akin to the War Powers
Resolution in controlling the executive, which therefore lacks the power of
interpretation. At the same time, FISA is a statute that the executive
implements, and perhaps it is best treated as such.
B. The Executive and International Comity
The executive plays an important role in litigation that affects foreign
sovereigns, even when the executive is not a party. Deference to the executive is
an established element of many international relations doctrines, but the law
has -peculiarly- not settled on a general principle of deference when an
executive agency advances an interpretation of a statute that has foreign
relations implications.
The argument in this Section has a degree of complexity, and it may be
useful to set out the basic argument in advance. In many cases, the executive
should be entitled to Chevron deference under the terms of existing doctrine
because it will be acting pursuant to formal procedures or other channels that
trigger Chevron. Even if no such mechanisms are involved, we believe that a
grant of authority to the executive in the domain of foreign affairs ought
generally to include a power of interpretation, so that Chevron deference is
appropriate. The international relations doctrines should not operate as
constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One. If the executive's
interpretation is unreasonable, of course, it will be invalid under Step Two, but
Step Two invalidations are rare in the domestic sphere, 90 and they should be
86. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8o-946 (2ooo).
87. See infra Section W.C.
88. 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548.
89. 50 U.S.C. § 18o1-1862 (2000).
go. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 838 n.26 (20o6) (finding that a very small
percentage of cases, both in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, invalidate agency
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rare here as well. If there is no interpretation of a statutory term but simply a
policy judgment by the executive, the courts should defer as well, using
Chevron as an analogy. The avoidance canon provides an important exception,
and there are others. But the international relations doctrines do not belong in
the same category as that canon or other such exceptions.
It is possible to fear, as Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal do, that our approach
"would accelerate the trend of circumventing Congress in key decisions
involving war powers and civil liberties" and "radically increas[e] the executive
branch's capacity... to break the law."9 But the fear is misplaced. Because we
would tether the executive to the expressed will of Congress, we would not
give the executive lawbreaking powers, and we would hardly eliminate
Congress as a major player in key decisions in foreign affairs. Chevron itself is
far from a blank check to the executive; the power to interpret ambiguities is
not the power to ignore statutes. At the Supreme Court itself, the executive
loses about one-third of the time, even when Chevron is applied.92 Within the
lower courts, prominent agencies lose at an even higher rate. 93 Indeed, we
believe that our proposal may well have a democracy-promoting function, one
that should appeal to those who seek a greater role for Congress: if the national
legislature distrusts the President, it has every reason to legislate clearly, so as
to reduce his room to maneuver. A future Congress, for example, might issue a
more detailed AUMF, one that more carefully described the entities against
which force could be used and the limits under which the President might
operate, rather than leaving those issues to a President it did not trust or to
courts that had no expertise in the area. In this respect, our approach might
well revitalize Congress's own role, precisely by encouraging greater
specificity.94
decisions under Step Two). Review of executive interpretations for reasonableness
nonetheless should be expected to have a significant function. It would, for example, raise
questions about apparently arbitrary differences across time or across nations, as in an
executive judgment that the civil rights statutes apply in England and Germany but not in
France and Italy; any such judgment would have to be explained.
9. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Karyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230,
1234 (2007).
92. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 9o, at 831-33.
93. See id. at 849 (reporting a validation rate of 64% in EPA and NLRB cases).
94. Jinks and Katyal contend that under our approach, "[m] embers of Congress, when enacting
legislation, would now have to contemplate whether any statutory ambiguities would be
used to permit the President to violate longstanding treaty commitments." Jinks & Katyal,
supra note 91, at 1275. Perhaps. But Congress can also incorporate those commitments into
the authorizing statute or any general statute. Aware of the President's power of
interpretation, Congress might well impose greater restrictions on what the President can
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One additional note before we begin. It is tempting to evaluate any
institutional proposal in the light of current events- for example, to assess our
suggestion with close reference to the approach of a particular administration
(e.g., the Bush Administration) to a set of prominent issues (say, civil liberties
in connection with the war on terror). We suspect, though we are not sure,
that the skeptical reaction of Jinks and Katyal is not entirely uninfluenced by
visible controversies in which the Bush Administration is widely perceived to
have interpreted law in a way that is both wrong and likely to undermine
important social values. We hope that our own arguments will not be assessed
in such a narrow frame. As many of our examples suggest, our proposal would
permit the executive to interpret statutes in a way that should be congenial to
those skeptical of the Bush Administration -for example, by applying civil
rights and environmental statutes extraterritorially.
Those who accept Chevron itself must acknowledge that it will lead to many
results that they find uncongenial (perhaps by allowing certain administrations
to interpret environmental statutes narrowly). The argument for Chevron
depends on a broader set of institutional judgments. In the domain of foreign
relations, the application of Chevron should not be ruled out of bounds by
pointing to cases in which, say, the Bush Administration has interpreted
ambiguous statutes so as to compromise desirable principles of international
law. As we shall suggest, the ultimate evaluation should depend on more
general judgments about institutional capacities.
1. Traditional Deference to the Executive in Foreign Relations
In some ways, deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is
commonplace. Before the enactment of the FSIA, courts would relax sovereign
immunity when the executive suggested that they should do so. This practice
was institutionalized in the twentieth century. The State Department would
intervene in cases when it preferred a particular outcome, and courts typically
followed the view of the Department. 9 Indeed, courts deferred to a kind of
executive jurisprudence, parsing State Department opinions for principles that
would control cases in which the State Department did not intervene. 96 Today,
courts continue to take account of the executive's views in FSIA cases97 and to
do. Chevron does not limit Congress's role in any way. Chevronizing foreign relations law
would not reduce legislative power; it would reduce judicial power (to resolve ambiguities
on the basis of either canons of interpretation or policy).
95. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
96. See id. at 487-88.
97. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 & n.21 (2004).
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engage in pre-FSIA style deference to the executive in cases involving head-of-
state immunity.
98
In addition, a strain of thinking about the act of state doctrine has long
held that courts should defer when the executive informs them that this
doctrine should not apply in a particular case. 99 In a clear analogy to Chevron,
courts also usually give weight to the executive's interpretation of a treaty.' °°
They defer absolutely to the executive's decision whether to recognize a foreign
state. "' And even when the executive and Congress come into conflict about
the extent of their respective foreign relations responsibilities, in most
instances courts effectively defer to the executive by refusing to decide on the
merits because of concerns about justiciability."0 2 In the face of such a refusal,
the views of the executive prevail.
98. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 ( 7th Cir. 2004) (deferring to the executive's recognition of the
President of China's immunity); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3 d 12o6 (11th Cir. 1997)
(deferring to the executive's denial of immunity to the former leader of Panama).
99. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964), superseded by statute,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. S 2370(e)(2) (2000)). But see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (plurality opinion) (rejecting blanket deference to the
executive, but suggesting that the executive's views are entitled to weight).
loo. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000). A recent war on
terror case exemplifies this view. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va.
2002) (deferring to the executive's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions); see also
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006). A contrary view is urged in Evan
Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 1t2 YALE L.J. 1927, 1931
(2003), on two grounds: (i) the meaning of treaties is controlled by the expectations of the
parties, not by the will of the executive, which is an interested party; and (2) treatymakers
cannot delegate interpretive power to the executive because executive institutions "lack
independent law-generative power absent a treaty partner's consent." With respect to (2),
the problem is that when a treaty is ambiguous, some institution-either the executive or
the judiciary-has to interpret it, and hence some kind of presumed delegation is
unavoidable. A presumed delegation to the executive seems both more natural and better
than a delegation to the federal courts. With respect to (i), we agree that the expectations of
the parties are controlling, but by hypothesis there are no clear expectations in the face of
ambiguity. It is true that the executive is the representative of an interested contracting
party, see id. at 1930, but the courts are also representatives of the United States without the
dual advantages of expertise and accountability. We acknowledge the possibility that the
interpretation of the executive may reflect some kind of bias.
1o. See Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F. 3d 1142, 1145 ( 9 th Cir.
1999).
102. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(addressing treaty termination); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(addressing the War Powers Resolution); see also Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 19o, 193
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Deference to the executive in foreign relations cases is traditionally based
on both constitutional and functional considerations. Courts sometimes say
that the executive has the primary foreign relations power."°3 This power is
traced to the Vesting Clause of Article II and other provisions.0 4 But the
explicit grants of foreign relations power to the executive are rather sparse and
ambiguous. From the document itself, it is hardly clear that the executive has
"primary" authority in the domain of foreign affairs.' 05 Hence the underlying
justifications are often less textual than functional, based on traditional
practices and understandings. Courts say that the nation must speak in "one
voice" in its foreign policy; the executive can do this, while Congress and the
courts cannot." 6 They say that the executive has expertise and flexibility, can
keep secrets, can efficiently monitor developments, and can act quickly and
decisively; the other branches cannot.' °7 As emphasized in Chevron, the
executive, unlike the judiciary, is politically accountable as well as uniquely
knowledgeable, and its accountability argues for deference to its judgments
about how to assess the competing facts and values."° Of course, none of these
advantages justifies absolute deference to the executive in all cases, and courts
have not gone this far. The executive cannot violate a clear law (putting
constitutional questions to one side). But in cases of ambiguity, courts are
inclined to defer to the position of the executive.
2. Conflicts Between Regulations and International Comity
In light of this longstanding deference to the executive, it is surprising that
courts have not, so far, consistently and clearly indicated that they will accept
the views of the executive about whether to apply the international relations
doctrines. °9 Suppose that the executive interprets a statute in a manner that
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing on political question grounds a lawsuit concerning Henry
Kissinger's authorization of CIA intervention in Chile).
1o3. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
104. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 35-45 (2d ed.
1996).
105. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 47, 66-68 (discussing
constitutional provisions giving certain foreign affairs authority to Congress).
1o6. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-14 (2003).
1ol. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
io8. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86S-66 (1984).
iog. Compare Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (reserving the question of
deference), and Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (giving deference), with First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 4o6 U.S. 759 (1972) (rejecting deference).
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violates those doctrines. Should a court defer to this interpretation, or should it
reverse the interpretation on the grounds that it violates the doctrines?
This question might well pose a literal conflict between Chevron deference
and the international relations principles. Suppose, for example, that an agency
entitled to Chevron deference issues a regulation that conflicts with the
international relations principles. If so, the court must develop rules of priority.
Alternatively, the conflict might not literally involve Chevron because the
executive has not exercised delegated power to make rules or to conduct
adjudications"' -but it might nonetheless present a difficult question of how
to reconcile executive power with comity. Suppose, for example, that the
Department of Justice concludes that antitrust law should apply outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States, but the decision does not follow any
kind of formal procedure. If the decision is offered in litigation, it is possible
that Chevron deference would be denied on the ground that litigation positions
do not receive deference."' Nonetheless, we believe that such deference is due
to litigation positions in the domain of foreign relations and that even if
deference is not formally given, a court might want to pay a great deal of
attention to the views of the executive.
In the face of a conflict between the executive's view and the comity
principles, a court might take one of three positions. First, it could hold that
international comity doctrines prevail over the executive's interpretation.
Perhaps the principles would be treated as part of Chevron Step One and thus
defeat the executive's view. Second, a court could hold that the executive's
interpretation prevails. Perhaps the executive, in effect, has discretion whether
to interpret a statute in a way that violates international law or potentially
offends foreign sovereigns. Third, a court might hold that some middle
position is preferable: perhaps the executive interpretation and the
international comity doctrines receive equal weight. A court might, for
example, require the executive to take account of international comity but defer
to an interpretation that endangers comity for especially good reasons.
The case law, so far, reflects a range of positions and is difficult to parse;
there is no settled view about the relationship between the views of the
executive and the doctrines. In some cases, the views of the executive have
11o. In some circumstances, an agency is entitled to Chevron deference even if it has not exercised
such power. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
iii. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988); Fla. Manufactured Hous.
Ass'n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1574 (iith Cir. 1995).
1203
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
HeinOnline  -- 116 Yale L.J. 1203 2006-2007
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
proved crucial."1 2 In other cases, courts have referred to the comity doctrines
without paying much attention to the position of the executive."'
C. The Argument for Executive Power
Our minimal suggestion here is that in cases in which the executive has
adopted an interpretation via rulemaking or adjudication, or is otherwise
entitled to deference under standard principles of administrative law, the
executive's interpretations should prevail over the comity doctrines. Those
doctrines, we argue, should not be treated as part of the court's analysis under
Chevron Step One. It follows that courts should defer to the executive's
judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable, or
constitutionally questionable. The executive is in the best position to reconcile
the competing interests at stake, and in the face of statutory silence or
ambiguity, Congress should therefore be presumed to have delegated
interpretive power to the executive. If the executive decides that the statute
should be interpreted so as to overcome the comity principles, it ought to be
lim. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (deferring to the
President as to whether an alien could be removed to Somalia without his consent when the
statute was ambiguous); Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F. 3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (holding that the Commerce Department's interpretation trumped international trade
law). For similar cases in which Chevron deference seemed to trump deference to
international trade treaties and case law, see Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F. 3d
1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which held that international law concerns were only a "guide";
Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F. 3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which held that a Commerce
Department interpretation trumped concerns over WTO violations; and Federal Mogul Corp.
v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995), in which the court deferred to the Commerce
Department's methodologies in determining antidumping margins.
113. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (rejecting an EEOC
interpretation of an ambiguous provision of Title VII that violated the presumption against
extraterritoriality), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § lo9,
105 Stat. 1071, lo77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 20ooe(f) (2000)). Justice Scalia, concurring,
argued that the interpretation was not reasonable, even if Chevron applied. See id. at 260
(Scalia, J., concurring). The dissent argued that the EEOC's interpretation was entitled to
deference and that the statute was best interpreted to apply abroad, at least when U.S.
nationals were involved. See id. at 260-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Small v. United
States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to a
law concerning gun possession); Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F. 3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying the Charming Betsy canon to an alien removal law). For a case somewhere in the
middle, see Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 135-36 (2005), in which the
Court agreed with regulatory agencies that the Americans with Disabilities Act should be
applied to foreign-flagged ships in American waters in a manner that did not violate
international law.
1204
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:1170 2007
HeinOnline  -- 116 Yale L.J. 1204 2006-2007
CHEVRONIZING FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
permitted to interpret the statute in that way. There is no reason to distrust the
executive's competence in making the underlying choices.
Beyond this minimal suggestion, we contend that in the domain of foreign
relations, the approach signaled in Chevron should apply even if the executive is
not exercising delegated authority to make rules or conduct adjudications. It is
highly relevant here that considerations of constitutional structure argue
strongly in favor of deference to the executive-a point that makes the
argument for deference stronger than in Chevron itself. For those who reject
this contention, we suggest that the level of deference signaled by the Court's
decision in Mead provides the proper standard-and that Skidmore deference,
even if weaker, confers a measure of authority on the executive.
Our basic conclusions follow from the grounds for the international comity
principles. We have criticized the entanglement theory, but even if the theory is
right, the executive branch, unlike the judiciary, is in a good position to know
whether concerns about entanglement justify a decision to invoke comity. If
the executive is not worried about entanglement, and if Congress has expressed
no such worry through legislation, the argument for deference to the executive
is strong. Litigation produces entanglement problems when the decision on the
merits is likely to offend a foreign sovereign, perhaps leading it to withdraw
cooperation in some area of foreign relations that is vital to America's interests.
The court has no expertise in determining whether a certain kind of litigation
will offend a foreign sovereign, whether the sovereign is likely to respond by
reducing cooperation, or whether such cooperation is valuable. These
judgments are all at the core of the foreign relations expertise of the executive.
Now consider the consequentialist theory. The underlying inquiries
required by this theory are highly complex and have empirical and normative
dimensions, for which the executive's institutional position gives it a decisive
advantage over the courts -even more so than under the entanglement theory.
Two points are important here.
First, the executive branch carefully tracks relations with foreign states.
Thus it is in a better position to predict whether a particular act of deference to
foreign interests is likely to result in reciprocation by foreign states or whether
such states would retaliate for a violation of the comity principles. The
prediction is based on subtle factors- including the nature of the relationship
with the foreign state, the cultural norms of that state, its legal system and
other institutions, its politics, and so forth. These are factors followed and
assessed by the Department of State. They are well beyond the usual kind of
judicial fact-finding.
It follows that the executive branch is in a better position to understand the
benefits of foreign reciprocation or the likelihood and costs of retaliation than
the judiciary. Suppose, for example, that in response to litigation against China
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by Chinese victims of state repression, China begins to issue vague threats
against Taiwan. Are these threats credible? Are they meant to signal that China
will take a more confrontational stance toward Taiwan if the United States
allows Chinese citizens to sue China for human rights violations? Or do they
perhaps signal a general chilling of relations, in which case the United States
may have more trouble obtaining Chinese assistance in pressuring Iran to
abandon its nuclear plans? Courts cannot answer these questions; the executive
can.
The second point involves accountability. In deciding whether American
law should be applied abroad, or whether a statute should be construed in
conformance with international law, the executive must balance competing
interests and make value judgments. It must ask questions not only about
reciprocity and retaliation, but also about the importance of applying, say, the
National Labor Relations Act to protect Americans aboard a foreign ship in
American waters, or the ban on sex discrimination to American companies
doing business in China, or the Endangered Species Act to the activities of
American institutions operating in Japan."14 At least at first glance, those
judgments should be made by those who are accountable to the public, not by
courts. The executive might well pay a price if it concluded that American civil
rights or environmental law ought not be applied to American activities in
other nations. As in the Chevron context, the executive is far more likely than a
court to be punished by the public if it causes or fails to resolve tensions with
other countries or a foreign policy crisis. Indeed, although courts routinely
anger foreign sovereigns, ' we cannot think of any case in which the public has
put pressure on courts because of such crises - probably because the connection
between judicial decisions and international tensions is not salient enough.
The flip side of accountability is concern about political bias."6 Because
courts are independent, they may be more neutral than the executive, and thus
perhaps more likely to interpret the statute impartially. But this concern is
identical in the Chevron context in which, as we noted, courts have plausibly
concluded that the executive's control over policy justifies its heightened
114. One court has held, however, that the ESA applies abroad. See Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 199o) (holding that the clear text of the ESA requires
extraterritorial application), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). But see Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, No. CV-oi-o7781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2636o, at
*65, *70 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (citing an implementing regulation applying the ESA
"upon the high seas," but finding "unpersuasive" the argument that the ESA applies "in the
territorial waters of another nation").
115. See LOWENFELD, supra note 13, at 633-37.
116. See Criddle, supra note loo.
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authority over the interpretation of statutes. In any case, judges may have
biases of their own. Any relevant "bias" on the part of the executive in the
domain of foreign affairs is best understood as the operation of democracy in
action-at least if the executive's interpretation is reasonable and if
constitutionally sensitive issues are not involved.
Thus, the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in
the foreign relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting, while the
accountability rationale for deference is at least equally strong. These
conclusions suggest that if the approach in Chevron is correct, deference to
executive interpretations in foreign relations cases must also be the appropriate
approach. The core reason is that resolution of statutory ambiguities involves
judgments of policy, and those judgments are best made by the executive.
None of this means that courts have no relevant expertise. Courts might have a
better sense than the executive of how enforcement of foreign judgments may
harm the integrity of the American judicial system. But this advantage is
relatively minor compared to the advantages of the executive.
What we have said so far also applies when statutes and common law are
relatively clear-i.e., outside the Chevron setting-if the executive branch
argues that the court should dismiss the case rather than reach the merits.
Here, to be sure, there is a greater danger of conflict between the executive and
Congress, but Congress has not objected to the traditional doctrines of
executive deference, and until it does so, the constitutional problems seem
more theoretical than real. 117 The normative question is whether the executive's
institutional expertise gives it advantages over courts in this setting as it does in
the Chevron setting, and the answer is surely yes. In both cases, the argument
for deference to the executive is that it has more expertise than the courts in
foreign relations and that the executive's accountability for foreign relations is
more important than the courts' independence from political pressure."8
117. With one exception: the Senate has objected to the executive's claim that its interpretations
supersede interpretations communicated to the Senate when it consents to a treaty, and it
frequently has attached conditions to treaties in which it expressed this view. See Gary
Michael Buechler, Constitutional Limits on the President's Power To Interpret Treaties: The
Sofaer Doctrine, the Biden Condition, and the Doctrine of Binding Authoritative Representations,
78 GEO. L.J. 1983 (1990).
118. It is possible to raise one more concern: federalism. But courts have had little patience for
federalism arguments in foreign relations cases; it is clear that the foreign policy of the
national government prevails over the statutory and common law of the states. See, e.g., Am.
Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that executive diplomatic policy
prevails over state law); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding that state laws with foreign relations
impact may be preempted even when there is no conflicting federal statute or treaty).
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D. A Historical Evolution
Many of the international relations principles are very old. The Charming
Betsy doctrine, the presumption against extraterritoriality, international comity,
foreign sovereign immunity, the penal and revenue rules, and the act of state
doctrine can all be traced back to the nineteenth century, and most of them to
the early years of the Republic. 19 Many of them evolved during the ascendancy
of ideas that are no longer important or even relevant in American
jurisprudence -including natural law ideas and the pre-Erie conception of the
common law-and in a period when the United States was a small, weak
nation whose foreign policy was inward-looking and in some ways isolationist.
The national government was weaker relative to the states, and the presidency
was weaker relative to Congress. 2 °
Things are almost unimaginably different today. The vast changes in
foreign policy, the greater relative power of the United States, the institutional
development of American government, and new ways of thinking about law
suggest that the international relations principles need to be reconceived. We
offer here a brisk overview of the relevant developments. The basic point is that
Chevron represents a clear judicial recognition of changing developments in the
domestic domain; a parallel shift, recognizing interpretive power for the
executive, might well be taken as recognition of related developments on the
international side. Indeed, the latter shift, in the domain of foreign affairs, is
far simpler to explain and to defend than the former one. In these
circumstances, the real oddity is that domestic law has been Chevronized
whereas foreign relations law has not.
It is a commonplace that the rise of the administrative state in the twentieth
century revolutionized constitutional law."' Under nineteenth-century
constitutional law, it was assumed that while Congress would regulate the
national market, most important domestic issues would be controlled by states
119. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 25o (1897) (act of state doctrine); Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895) (international comity); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (io Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)
(penal rule); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 61o (1818) (presumption against
extraterritoriality); The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (foreign
sovereign immunity); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)
(Charming Betsy doctrine).
120. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984 (5th rev. ed. 1984)
(tracing the rise of the power of the presidency over the course of American history);
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (2004) (same).
121. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, lOl HARv. L. REV. 421
(1987).
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and municipalities; these included labor-management relations, environmental
protection, commercial fraud, antitrust problems, workplace safety, and much
more.1" Massive technological change in the late nineteenth century-and the
emergence of an industrialized, interdependent, highly urbanized national
economy -undermined this allocation of authority. In the twentieth century,
courts and the political branches ultimately agreed that much regulation would
need to occur at the national level, despite the losses to local control and other
federalism values. 123 They also agreed that although the executive usually could
not act without congressional authorization, broad delegations of regulatory
authority were necessary and permissible because of the many institutional
advantages of the executive, including specialization and the capacity for
flexible responses to rapidly changing circumstances.1 4 Chevron itself can be
seen as a culmination of this development. Indeed, the decision is a natural
product of the repudiation of judge-made common law and the large-scale
shift to lawmaking by executive institutions. 25
It is easy to see a parallel process occurring in foreign relations law, though
with one wrinkle. 6 The Framers agreed that the national government's
foreign relations powers would be less restricted than its domestic relations
powers, and so formally the national government has had a freer hand from the
beginning.'27 The major change was thus in the realm of separation of powers,
and specifically the massive increase in the executive's foreign affairs power
relative to that of Congress."28 Critics of this transformation fear executive
122. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEw AMERICAN STATE: THE ExPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 19-35 (1982).
123. For an overview, see STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 18-20 (6th ed. 2006).
124. See id. at 71-74. For a classic statement in favor of administrative discretion, see JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
125. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2583-84 (20o6).
126. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85
VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 19-21 (1999). As White has pointed out, the transformation of foreign
relations law predated the transformation of domestic constitutional law by a few decades.
This historical fact makes it possible, though perhaps too conveniently, to trace the foreign
constitutional law transformation to America's achievement of great power status at the end
of the Spanish-American War in 1898, just as it is possible to trace the domestic
constitutional law transformation to the period following the Great Depression.
127. See l BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE
CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 58-59 (1993).
128. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 120, at ix-x.
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overreaching,12 9 and there is reasonable dispute about the extent of this risk
and about how best to limit it. But critics and supporters agree that changes in
the global environment justify at least some expansion of executive powers.
To say this is not to take a stand on whether the President can act on his
own. It is merely to acknowledge that legislation often grants the executive
some discretion to act rapidly in response to perceived threats. Hence, the
increase in executive power, usually made possible by statutes, has reflected a
recognition by Congress of this pragmatic point. 3 In these circumstances,
deference to the executive's views on the meaning of ambiguous statutes,
rather than invocation of the comity principles, is a step that seems at once
modest and a bit late. To be sure, the executive often acts outside of the context
of crises or genuine emergencies, and our argument extends far beyond those
limited settings, in which no one wants courts to issue temporary restraining
orders. But even when time is not of the essence, the stakes are often very high,
and the question remains: when a statute is ambiguous, should the ambiguity
be settled by courts or the executive? If the executive's interpretation is
reasonable and does not raise serious constitutional problems, we think that
the answer is clear.
E. Objections and Responses
We are aware that our proposal faces a number of potential objections. Let
us explore them in sequence.
1. Nondelegation Canons?
It would be possible to respond that some or all of the comity doctrines
should be seen as nondelegation canons. If this is so, then a clear statement
from Congress is required to produce a result that compromises comity.
Perhaps the doctrines apply under Step One and thus forbid contrary
interpretations from the executive. The most obvious candidate for this
approach is the principle calling for conformity to international law. For
example, Jinks and Katyal appear to understand the Charming Betsy canon in
these terms, suggesting that the executive is bound by international law in the
129. In the context of individual rights, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
130. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989)
(describing statutes delegating emergency powers to the executive, as well as congressional
and judicial acquiescence in broad executive interpretations of those statutes).
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face of statutory ambiguity.' 1 The same analysis might be applied to the
presumption against extraterritoriality.' 2
In our view, however, there are serious problems with any effort to classify
the comity doctrines as nondelegation canons. It is reasonable to say that
Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to raise a serious constitutional question
and thus that the executive may not raise such a question on its own;'13 courts
plausibly insist that the national lawmaker must expressly authorize invasions
of constitutionally sensitive domains. But in light of the distinctive role of the
executive in the area of foreign relations,'1 4 a clear statement principle would
make no structural sense, at least as a general rule.
A more refined version of this argument would attempt to disaggregate the
comity principles and urge that one or a few of them, such as the principle
against violations of international law, trump executive interpretations.
Invoking the notion of an "executive-constraining zone," Jinks and Katyal refer
to international law that has the status of supreme federal law and suggest that
such law should not be subject to the interpretive authority of the executive.'35
We agree that the executive is bound by such law. But we also believe that self-
executing treaties and statutes incorporating international law should be
subject to executive interpretation to the extent that they are ambiguous and
the executive's interpretation is reasonable. Indeed, it is well established that
when treaties are ambiguous, the executive has a degree of interpretive
power.13 6 There are significant advantages to permitting the executive, rather
than the courts, to settle genuine ambiguities when doing so turns on
131. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1268.
132. Cf. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (suggesting that the
internal affairs clear statement rule is part of a set of "clear statement rules [that] ensure
Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently
or without due deliberation"). But see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Dep't of the Navy, No.
CV-o1-07781, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002) (respecting an
executive regulation requiring the ESA to be applied outside of American territory and on
the high seas).
133. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d lO69, 1076 (9 th Cir. 2006).
134. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005), for a recent
statement.
135. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1234.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); David J. Bederman, Revivalist
Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994). To be sure, it is plausible to
raise questions about this idea. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty
Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1439 (1999) (criticizing judicial deference to
executive interpretations of treaties).
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judgments of policy and principle. Judges do not lack biases of their own, as
the Chevron cases themselves establish. 37
Jinks and Katyal contend that when international law is incorporated into
national law, is made at least partly outside of the executive, and regulates the
executive, ' the executive lacks the authority of interpretation. We assume that
they mean by this the authority to interpret ambiguous treaties, given that
under our Chevronizing approach clear treaties are not subject to
interpretations by the executive. If they are right on this point, much of our
argument remains untouched; they are objecting to a small though important
piece of the puzzle. But here as well, Jinks and Katyal are rejecting current law,
which includes no such exception to the principle that the President is entitled
to interpret ambiguous treaties. And if taken as generally as it appears to be
meant, their view cannot be reconciled with the premises of Chevron itself. The
evident appeal of their proposal lies in the principle that foxes should not guard
henhouses - that those limited by law should not be able to interpret the scope
of the limitation. But Chevron itself complicates this principle, on the apparent
theory that the courts, and not the executive, might turn out to be the fox.
2. Self-Dealing
It is tempting to object that there is a risk of self-dealing whenever the
executive interprets statutes that grant and limit its own authority. Invoking
this concern, Jinks and Katyal contend that "Chevron deference should not be
awarded to agencies when they interpret organic law in the executive-
constraining zone."139
We are alert to the risk of self-dealing, but it is important to make some
distinctions. Chevron applies to agency interpretations of statutes, not of
regulations, and the executive's interpretation of regulations is not our topic
here. 140 In any case, existing law hardly deprives agencies of Chevron deference
"when they interpret [statutes] in the executive-constraining zone."'14 Most of
the relevant statutes, including the statute in Chevron itself, constrain as well as
137. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 90, at 834-63 (showing the effect of judges' political
convictions in applying Chevron).
138. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1236.
139. Id. at 1266.
140. That issue is governed by Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which
called for judicial deference to agency interpretation of agency regulations. It is unclear why
the ordinary principle of Seminole Rock would not apply in the domain of foreign affairs, and
Jinks and Katyal make no argument against its application.
141. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1266.
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empower agencies. If agencies are denied Chevron deference whenever they are
construing statutes that constrain their own powers, then agencies will always
be denied Chevron deference.'
42
We think but are not sure that Jinks and Katyal mean to object, in
particular, to our suggestion that the executive can interpret statutory
ambiguities so as to violate non-self-executing treaties and customary
international law, in violation of the Charming Betsy canon, which they
repeatedly extol.1 43 (Recall that the canon is necessary only if international law
has not been enacted into domestic law.) We have rejected the view that
Charming Betsy might be taken as a nondelegation canon, but we understand
that view and the arguments that can be invoked on its behalf. However, we
see no reason for thinking that courts are more sensitive to international law
than the executive is, whether international law is understood in the capacious
and'optimistic sense claimed by Jinks and Katyal or in a narrower one.' 44 The
executive, far more than the courts, will feel the political consequences if a
misinterpretation or violation of international law leads to an international
crisis, and it can better appreciate the consequences when international law and
geopolitics collide. 4 Even if we are wrong on this point, the essentials of our
view remain intact.
3. Mead, Chevron, and Bureaucracy
Jinks and Katyal offer a creative argument in the alternative. They suggest
that deference should be granted only if the executive has followed some kind
of internal procedure that ensures balanced decision-making. The central idea
appears to be that the executive must allow a significant role for its own expert
142. As we have noted, some statutes, such as FOIA and the APA, constrain agencies without
delegating interpretive power to them; to the extent that statutes in the foreign relations
domain are analogous, they do not provide sensible occasions for Chevron deference.
143. E.g., Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1263,1268.
144. See id. at 1266-67.
145. As a simple example, consider the case of Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. United
Parcel Service, 177 F. 3d 1142 (9 th Cir. 1999), in which the outcome turned on whether
Taiwan was a party to an international treaty. Taiwan was not a signatory, but China was;
Taiwan is formally a part of China, not a sovereign state, yet as a functional matter it is
treated as a sovereign state by the United States and other countries. If the court had held
that Taiwan was not a party, it might have angered China; if it held that Taiwan was a
party, it might have angered Taiwan. Sensibly, the court deferred to the State Department's
view instead of basing its holding on its own interpretation of international law. It is the
executive, not the judiciary, that will have to deal with the diplomatic aftermath.
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bureaucrats and that if the ultimate decision departs from "deliberative and
sober bureaucratic decision-making," no deference is due. 146
We agree that the executive ought to use procedures that improve
deliberation, which requires the incorporation of expert knowledge. But we do
not think that courts should require such procedures as a precondition for
deference. In the ordinary context of administrative law, an agency receives
Chevron deference even if the Administrator decides on a course of conduct that
departs from the views of her informed staff. Courts do not look behind the
agency's process to explore who, exactly, influenced the decision and to what
extent. 147 An investigation of that process would strain judicial capacities and
discourage candor within the agency. It would also disregard the fact that the
ultimate decision is legitimately made by the agency head, not the staff. Of
course that decision would be struck down if it were unreasonable under
Chevron Step Two or were otherwise arbitrary. 148 In fact, arbitrariness review-
not judicial investigation of the internal workings of the agency-operates as
the principal check on agency decisions that attend insufficiently to the facts.
It would be possible to take the Jinks and Katyal argument in a more
conventional way. Perhaps they mean to say that when the agency is not
entitled to Chevron deference under standard principles, it should not receive
such deference in the domain of foreign affairs. As we have noted, agencies
receive Chevron deference when they are exercising delegated authority to make
rules or to conduct adjudication; when agencies are not exercising such power,
agencies may or may not receive Chevron deference. Perhaps Jinks and Katyal's
proposal can be amended to suggest that in the domain of foreign affairs,
rulemaking or adjudication is a necessary precondition for Chevron deference.
This is an amendment rather than an application of current law because agency
decisions sometimes receive deference even when rulemaking and adjudication
are not involved. 149
We disagree with this conclusion on the ground that even in those
circumstances, the executive, rather than the courts, should be allowed to sort
out ambiguities. But under current law, it is true that the executive sometimes
will not receive deference when no formal procedure has preceded its decision.
In the domain of foreign affairs, as elsewhere, it is certainly worth considering
146. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1281.
147. But cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1951) (allowing reviewing
courts to consider the contrary judgment of the hearing examiner as part of the review of the
whole record).
148. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983).
149. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002).
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the possibility that a mere litigation position is not entitled to judicial deference
or that the executive must state its views in some public place in advance of a
particular controversy. And if Jinks and Katyal do mean to work within current
law, the executive, deprived of Chevron deference, will nonetheless receive
Skidmore deference 's° -a lower level, to be sure, but one with which we (and
we expect the executive) would be quite willing to live.
4. Short Term, Long Term, and Stability
Under Chevron, administrative law doctrine faces a dilemma: what if the
Clinton Administration interprets the Clean Air Act in one way and the Bush
Administration disagrees? If the statute is ambiguous, might not Chevron
produce a great deal of instability in the meaning of national law, in a way that
makes it more difficult for Congress and the executive branch to maintain their
commitments?
The law is plain: as long as the underlying statute is unclear and the new
interpretation is reasonable, a President may depart from the views of his
predecessor. Chevron itself involved a shift by the Reagan Administration,
rejecting the view of the Carter Administration, and the Court upheld this
shift. The defense of this proposition is not obscure. The interpretation of
ambiguous statutes typically turns on judgments of policy, and thus it is
perfectly appropriate for shifts to occur in response to new facts and new
values. It would be hard to approve of a principle that would freeze the law
permanently in the mold chosen by the first President who made a relevant
choice.
Nonetheless, Jinks and Katyal object that our approach would not bar
"short-term executives from acting in ways that are against a nation's long-
term interests.""' They believe that under our approach, a President could
construe the Geneva Conventions narrowly, in a way that would ultimately
harm American interests, above all by subjecting American troops to a risk of
serious mistreatment. We do not take a position on the proper construction of
the Geneva Conventions, but the question of how to handle relevant
ambiguities is more complex than Jinks and Katyal allow. Suppose that the
President concludes that a narrow understanding of ambiguities in the Geneva
Conventions promises to help national security, and even to protect our troops,
because it will uncover relevant information and deter terrorism. Suppose
1s. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2ool); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944).
151. Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1262.
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further that this understanding would not weaken other nations' willingness to
comply with the Geneva Conventions but instead might increase their
willingness to comply (for example, because they approve of this
understanding). If so, the President's interpretation will serve, not undermine,
our long-term interests. Perhaps the President is wrong. Are federal judges
more likely to be right? We do not disagree with Jinks and Katyal's suggestion
that sometimes presidents devote excessive attention to the short term, but the
appropriate remedy is not to ask that policy decisions be made by courts.
We should add that Jinks and Katyal's claim that the President responds to
short-term incentives while the courts do not is self-defeating. If that is true
generally, then it must be true when presidents sign treaties as well as when
they seek to evade them, in which case an old treaty, entered into by a short-
sighted President, may very well undermine American interests today. We do
not mean to insist that this is necessarily the case, only to point out that the ad
hoc nature of Jinks and Katyal's empirical claims undermines their overall
argument. They note that the U.S. government regularly runs deficits,152 but
we assume that they do not want to turn fiscal policy over to the judiciary!
5. Eliminating Congress?
Jinks and Katyal think that we ignore the role of Congress, and they argue
that it would be better for courts to interpret ambiguities than to defer to the
President. It is easier, they contend, for Congress to correct the errors of courts
(because presidents will presumably go along) than to correct the errors of
presidents (who will threaten a veto).'s3 This point leads them to insist that we
should be comparing the President's and Congress's expertise and
accountability, rather than the President's and the courts'.
This argument simply denies the premise of our argument, taken from
Chevron. Chevron is rooted in the assumption that Congress must delegate its
powers because it does not have the time and resources to regulate. This is why
it sets up agencies like the EPA in the first place. If power is delegated to
nonexpert courts rather than to expert agencies, then more errors will occur
and Congress will have to correct them, defeating the purpose of delegation.
On this view, the risk of presidential bias is less troublesome than the risk of
judicial error. Congress is out of the picture to the extent that, by assumption,
it must delegate rather than regulate directly. Jinks and Katyal's argument
about "asymmetric" error applies to the ordinary Chevron context to the same
152. Id. at 1263.
153. See id. at 1253-55.
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extent that it applies to foreign relations. Our purpose is not to mount a new
defense of Chevron but to take the standard rationale as a given and argue that,
if it is correct, it applies with equal or greater force to foreign relations. When
statutes are genuinely ambiguous and someone must interpret them, we do not
understand how the choice is between the executive and Congress, rather than
between the executive and courts.
6. Miscellanea
A few other claims by Jinks and Katyal deserve brief comment. First, they
seem to think that our claim about the importance of speed and flexibility is
limited to times of crisis,"' for which existing norms and practices are
sufficient. Our emphasis on speed and flexibility is meant to refer to a general
characteristic of foreign relations, one that makes that area particularly
resistant to regulation by broad rules set out in advance by statute or by the
judiciary. The need for flexibility in domestic regulation, too, is a standard
rationale for relying on regulatory agencies rather than courts in the
administrative state. We merely extend this rationale to foreign relations.
Second, Jinks and Katyal object that we have failed to define the boundaries
to which our analysis applies."' s We can do no better than to say that our
analysis applies to litigation with substantial foreign relations implications-
indeed, under current law, courts already must decide whether or not litigation
has foreign relations implications. 's6 Boundary problems are ubiquitous in the
law, and Jinks and Katyal provide no reason for thinking that our boundary is
more troublesome than any other legal boundary. And to the extent that we
draw directly on Chevron, we eliminate a boundary, with the suggestion that
the Chevron framework should apply to executive interpretations in foreign
affairs as well as in the areas of environmental protection, communications
policy, and so on.
154. See id. at 1250, 1252.
155. See id. at 1257-62.
156. This problem arises frequently, for example, when states pass laws that are related to
traditional police powers but that also have foreign policy implications. See, e.g., Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down a state inheritance statute because of its
foreign affairs implications).
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IV. HARD CASES: THE AUMF AND THE WAR ON TERROR
It should be clear that the analysis thus far bears on many questions raised
by the war on terror. It is readily imaginable that congressional enactments will
contain ambiguous provisions that may or may not be construed to fit with the
international relations doctrines. The anti-comity principles, no less than the
comity principles, might conflict with the views of the executive in the context
of terrorism-related judgments. In our view, the executive should usually be
entitled to interpret genuinely ambiguous provisions as it sees fit, subject to the
qualifications that its interpretations must be reasonable and that Congress
must specifically authorize intrusions on constitutionally sensitive interests.
A. The AUMF in General
Because of the pervasive importance of the war on terror, the number of
imaginable cases is large. For example, the executive might want civil rights
statutes not to apply to American businesses operating in Saudi Arabia because
of the importance of Saudi Arabia's cooperation in combating terrorism. But
for purposes of analysis, it will be useful to focus on just one example, the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force, by which Congress authorized the
President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons."5 7
If the discussion thus far is correct, the President is permitted to interpret
ambiguities in the AUMF as he (reasonably) sees fit, even if the consequence is
to overcome the international comity doctrines.'s Indeed, the argument for
this conclusion is even stronger than in ordinary contexts because the basic
purpose of the AUMF is to protect the nation in a way that might well
compromise comity with some other nations.
157. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. 2002)).
158. This argument is developed in Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARv.
L. REV. 2663 (2oo5).
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A response might be supported with an analogy. The executive branch is
not entitled to Chevron deference insofar as it is enforcing the criminal law. 159
The reason is straightforward: prosecutors within the Department of Justice
have not been delegated the authority to interpret the statutes that they
implement. For the Department of Justice, the power of prosecution is not
plausibly taken to confer law-interpreting authority as well.16o Perhaps the
same can be said when the President implements the AUMF; indeed, it might
be urged that the President has the same relationship to the AUMF that the
Department of Justice has to criminal statutes. The analogy suggests a more
general point. To the extent that the President is not implementing the AUMF
with measures that have the force of law, the predicate for Chevron might seem
to be absent.
A narrow counterargument would be that under the AUMF, the President
or his delegates can indeed make rules and regulations, and thus if they do so,
they will be entitled to Chevron deference. An authorization to use force is best
taken to grant the power to issue necessary rules to ensure that force is properly
used. But suppose that no such rules have been issued. In the context of an
authorization to use force, most of the President's decisions are not preceded
by rulemaking or adjudication, and thus the grant or denial of such authority is
irrelevant. A delegation of prosecutorial power is very different, especially in
view of the rule of lenity, which asks courts to interpret statutory ambiguities
favorably to criminal defendants. It would be odd to assume that Congress
meant to give those who enforce the criminal law the authority to combine
prosecutorial and interpretive functions. By its very nature, any authorization
for the use of force is best taken as an implicit delegation to the President to
resolve genuine ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees fit. 6 '
Indeed, this conclusion seems appropriate for any delegation of power to
the President in the particular domain of foreign relations. The President's
159. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (199o). For an argument that existing law is
wrong on this count, see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 11o
HARv. L. REV. 469 (1996).
16o. But see Kahan, supra note 159. The best response, implicit in current law, is that a
combination of interpretive and prosecutorial power would disserve liberty, in part because
it would jeopardize the interest in fair notice; perhaps the prosecutor's interpretation would
surprise the defendant. In any case, rule of law principles suggest that criminal statutes
should not be construed as broadly as (some) prosecutors might like, given the distinctive
incentives of the prosecutorial arm of the government.
161. The same point has broader implications. It might well suggest that executive officers other
than the President-such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense-are entitled
to Chevron deference in the context of foreign affairs, even if they have not exercised
delegated authority to make rules or to conduct adjudications.
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interpretation must not, of course, plainly violate the law; if it did, it would be
struck down under Chevron Step One. Many imaginable interpretations of the
AUMF would be invalid. But insofar as the law is unclear, reasonable
interpretations deserve respect.
We have seen that Chevron is based on a legal fiction 62 about congressional
instructions with respect to interpretive power-a fiction that is rooted in
entirely sensible judgments, pragmatic in character, about institutional
capacities with respect to expertise and accountability. And if these are the
foundations for Chevron, then the implication here is straightforward: the
President should be taken to have the authority to interpret ambiguities as he
chooses. Interpretation of an authorization to use force, at least as much as any
delegation of authority to agencies, calls for an appreciation of consequences
and for complex judgments of value. For the AUMF, the best reconstruction of
congressional will is that ambiguities are subject to presidential interpretation.
B. Hamdi
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi does not speak in these terms, but
its conclusion is broadly consistent with them. We think that our approach
strengthens the plurality's conclusion. The plurality accepted the executive's
claim that the AUMF granted it the power to detain Hamdi,163
notwithstanding the Non-Detention Act, which forbids the executive to
imprison or detain a citizen of the United States without congressional
authorization.164 The AUMF is quite general, and under standard principles of
statutory interpretation, it should arguably yield to the prior, relatively specific
Non-Detention Act, which was intended to apply during wartime. This
conclusion might be supported by the idea that implied repeals are disfavored.
And indeed Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued-not
implausibly -that the AUMF was simply too vague to provide the kind of clear
authorization required by the Non-Detention Act for detention of an American
citizen. 6 1 He also suggested that the AUMF did not authorize the executive to
162. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). In light of the AUMF, it would not be easy to argue that the
Non-Detention Act settles the issue at Chevron Step One. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-29
(plurality opinion) (discussing powers created by the AUMF). We are not arguing here that
the executive has the power to interpret the Non-Detention Act, because that statute is more
plausibly seen as akin to the APA. Our focus is on the AUMF, which is, for reasons
explained in the text, an appropriate foundation for analysis under Chevron.
165. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 547-48 (Souter, J., concurring).
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violate international law and that the detentions did violate (or may have
violated) international law.' 66
The plurality rejected this conclusion. It argued that the AUMF clearly
authorized the executive to detain enemy combatants and thus satisfied the
Non-Detention Act. 6 7 The plurality's principal claim was that the power of
detention was a necessary implication of the power to use force. The plurality
also noted that the AUMF might implicitly incorporate principles of
international law, but that these principles did not forbid detention of enemy
combatants. 1
68
We believe that even if Justice Souter was correct to say that the AUMF was
ambiguous rather than clear, the plurality was right to accept the government's
claim that it had the authority to detain enemy combatants. If the AUMF was
ambiguous, the executive should have had discretion to interpret it in a
reasonable fashion, and it is surely reasonable to conclude that a statute that
authorizes the use of force also authorizes detention. 69 Further, even if both
opinions were correct in saying that the AUMF implicitly incorporated
international law, the government should have prevailed. Because the executive
has primacy in the interpretation of international law, its not-unreasonable
interpretation that the detentions complied with international law should
control. Indeed, the executive should be permitted to violate international law
if its interpretation of the domestic statute is reasonable and if the statute is
genuinely ambiguous. Less controversially, our approach would permit courts,
in future disputes about the scope of the AUMF, to resolve these disputes by
deferring to reasonable executive interpretations of the AUMF and of
international law (if the AUMF incorporates international law).
The difference between our approach and that of the Hamdi plurality can
be seen by imagining that active hostilities in Afghanistan cease but that the
United States refuses to release the detainees because they continue to pose a
terrorist threat. The plurality refused to address this issue but implied that the
detention would be unlawful:
166. See id. at 548-53.
167. Id. at 517 (plurality opinion).
168. See id. at 520-21.
16q. It would be possible to invoke the avoidance canon to ban an interpretation of the AUMF
that would allow detention of an American citizen, but the question of the power to detain is
analytically distinct from the due process question, which involves the proper procedures for
detention. The Court reasonably separated the question of statutory interpretation from the
due process issue.
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Further, we understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of
"necessary and appropriate force" to include the authority to detain for
the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on
longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a
given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But
that is not the situation we face as of this date. 17 °
The Court seemed to say that the AUMF implicitly incorporates
international law as a constraint on executive action, or perhaps that its
application to the hypothetical case would be ambiguous and so the Charming
Betsy canon should be applied. 17' In any event, the Court's interpretation of
international law would resolve the issue. We think the better approach is to
acknowledge the President's authority to interpret the statute in a reasonable
fashion, regardless of whether that interpretation results in a violation of
international law. Thus, the President would decide whether the AUMF
permitted him to detain enemy combatants after active hostilities ended while
the threat identified in the AUMF continued, and the Court would defer to a
reasonable decision. In making this decision, the President could take account
of the full range of relevant considerations, including American security, the
security of foreign states, the interests of the detainees' states in protecting
their citizens, the possible reactions of foreign states and organizations, moral
constraints, and larger concerns about any damage that would result to
international law in the abstract if the United States violated it.
Nothing said here suggests that the President's interpretive power is
unlimited. Congress has ultimate control, as long as it has not intruded on the
President's constitutional authority (an issue that we do not explore here). Any
effort to interpret the AUMF, or any other statute dealing with terror, must
contend with Chevron Steps One and Two and thus must count as a reasonable
construction of ambiguous terms.
There are other limitations. Suppose, for example, that the President makes
a plausible claim of statutory authority to engage in actions that threaten
constitutionally sensitive interests, such as the right to free speech or the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As we have seen, statutes
are generally not construed to threaten such interests, even under Chevron.
17o. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion).
171. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REv. 293 (2005); cf Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 79
(arguing that the AUMF should be interpreted in light of history and international law but
that it cannot be construed as forbidding the executive to violate international law).
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What is the role of the avoidance canon in the face of executive interpretation?
In our view, constitutionally sensitive rights should probably have a kind of
interpretive priority, in the sense that they defeat the interpretation of the
executive, just as in the domestic context.' 7 Of course any interpretive canon is
subject to legislative override. If Congress seeks to press the constitutional
issue, it is entitled to do so.
C. Hamdan
Consider in this light the Court's decision in Hamdan, which provides an
illuminating, and in a way striking, contrast with Hamdi. At issue was the
President's authority to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan in military commissions. In
brief, the Court held that the President lacked that authority under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.173 The Court held that the President had not made the requisite
showing that it would not be "practicable" to rely on the procedures in
ordinary courts-martial. 74 A plurality also concluded that "conspiracy" to
violate the law of war was not an offense triable by military commissions. 7 s
Under our framework, the conclusions in Hamdan might be supported in
the following way. Perhaps the President violated Step One of Chevron, even if
he was entitled to deference; perhaps the relevant sources of law were
sufficiently clear. But it would not be simple to defend this position. On the
key points, the provisions are at least ambiguous.'76 Perhaps it could be said
that in Hamdan, the President was not entitled to any kind of Chevron
deference because the UCMJ is the analytical equivalent of the APA or FOIA: a
statute that controls the executive, not a statute that the executive is charged
with implementing. This argument is not implausible, but it must contend
172. We do not address the question whether this proposition holds during emergencies,
including the emergency that produced the AUMF. Compare ERIc A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2007) (arguing that courts should defer to the
executive during emergencies), with Sunstein, supra note 105 (emphasizing the importance
of clear congressional authorization).
173. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006).
174. Id. at 2791.
17S. Id. at 2779 (plurality opinion).
176. Jinks and Katyal disagree. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1269-70. If they are right, and
the provisions were clear, then the case becomes easy under our framework as well as theirs.
Recall that under Chevron Step One, the executive loses when the statute is plain. The
President could not, for example, interpret the AUMF to justify the use of military force
against those not plausibly or reasonably connected with persons or organizations
responsible for the attacks of 9/11- an exceedingly important limitation on his authority.
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with the suggestion, pressed by the government and endorsed above, that the
AUMF is the relevant statute and that the President can plausibly understand it
to allow him to convene military commissions.
Standing by itself, we believe that the government's claim has considerable
force. But it faces two obstacles. First, the AUMF must be squared with the
UCMJ. If, as the Court suggested, the UCMJ is best read to disallow the
creation of military commissions, perhaps the AUMF must be interpreted to be
compatible with it, rather than to override it. On this view, the Court was
correct in Hamdan not because the President lacks authority to interpret the
AUMF, but because he cannot interpret the AUMF so as to override the UCMJ,
especially in light of the principle disfavoring implied repeals of legislation.
(Back to Chevron Step One.) The challenge here is to establish that the UCMJ
is sufficiently clear so as to disable the President from interpreting the AUMF
to allow him to establish military commissions. Without attempting to parse
the relevant provisions of the UCMJ, we will simply assert that under ordinary
understandings, it is not easy to meet that challenge.
The best way of doing that, and of understanding the result in Hamdan,
identifies a second obstacle to allowing the President to interpret the AUMF in
this manner. The obstacle here is a distinctive kind of nondelegation canon -
one that requires Congress to speak clearly if it seeks to allow the executive to
depart from the usual methods for conducting criminal trials. The motivating
idea is that unless Congress has unambiguously said otherwise, or unless
history clearly warrants, the government may not convict people (including
enemy combatants) of crimes except through the ordinary channels and
procedures, with their numerous guarantees against error and unfairness. In
our view, Hamdan is difficult to explain without resort to a principle of this
kind. Indeed, the plurality gestured in this direction with the suggestion that to
justify use of military commissions without explicit congressional authority,
"the precedent must be plain and unambiguous. To demand any less would be
to risk concentrating in military hands a degree of adjudicative and punitive
power in excess of that contemplated either by statute or by the
Constitution." 177
To be sure, the use of a clear statement principle of this sort would be
easiest to defend if it were undergirded by the Due Process Clause. Under the
avoidance canon, the President should not be permitted to raise serious due
process problems without clear congressional authorization. The Court did not
explicitly point to due process concerns in Hamdan. But its emphasis on
Hamdan's right to see the evidence against him, and to attend the trial, suggest
it. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780 (plurality opinion).
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that it was unwilling to allow a departure from traditional institutions and
traditional procedures unless Congress gave explicit authorization. 8
This reading of Hamdan, however, is in tension with the outcome in
Hamdi. Recall that in Hamdi, two Justices contended that the AUMF should
not be construed to overcome the Non-Detention Act and thus that explicit
congressional authorization was required to detain Hamdi;'79 the plurality
rejected this position. ' ° In Hamdan, by contrast, explicit authorization seemed
to be required for the use of military commissions. Why was a repeal by
implication found in Hamdi but rejected in Hamdan? If the two outcomes are
to be reconciled, perhaps the reason is that by tradition and necessity,
detention is clearly incidental to the authority to use force-whereas neither
tradition nor necessity clearly supports the use of military commissions in the
circumstances of Hamdan. But we are not at all confident that it can be shown
that detention is more traditional and necessary than military commissions:
both are established incidents of military action. Perhaps the better
reconciliation is that Hamdan rests on a distinctive clear statement principle for
use of nontraditional institutions for adjudicating guilt or innocence-a
principle that might particularly appeal to judges who are reluctant to second-
guess military decisions (such as those involving detention) but who are more
willing to insist on the traditional adjudicative forms. But a liberty interest was
at stake in both Hamdi and Hamdan; why should a clear statement principle
apply to an institution that adjudicates guilt or innocence and not to an
institution that determines whether a person is dangerous and therefore should
be detained?
It would be easy to suggest that under the analysis we have offered,
Hamdan is simply wrong -that the President reasonably construed the AUMF
to allow the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists. 8' The most
sympathetic reconstruction of Hamdan sees it as a vindication of an implicit
178. Jinks and Katyal are wrong to suggest that our Article implies approval of the idea that the
Constitution does not protect detainees abroad. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 91, at 1271-72.
We cited Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), in our earlier works to describe the law,
not to endorse it.
179. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539, 547-48 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
18o. Id. at 517 (plurality opinion).
181. Indeed, Justice Thomas's reliance on the principle of executive deference, based on the
President's institutional advantages, is very much in the spirit of our argument that foreign
relations should be Chevronized. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823-24, 2845-46 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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interpretive principle to the effect that Congress must explicitly authorize a
departure from standard adjudicative forms and procedures.182
D. A Note on Congress
It might be thought that the argument for judicial deference to executive
interpretation of ambiguous law serves, in a sense, to take the side of the
executive against the national legislature. On an extreme version of the view
that we have defended, the expertise of the executive and its special role in the
domain of foreign affairs mean that courts should grant discretion to the
executive unless Congress has made its view unmistakably clear-and possibly
even when Congress has done so. Chevron-style deference, mixed with a
requirement of an exceedingly clear congressional statement, might be taken to
suggest a transfer of authority, not from courts to the executive, but from
Congress to the President.
Our argument should not be taken in this way. Nothing we have said here
is inconsistent with the view that the executive must follow the will of
Congress. The issues we have explored involve genuinely ambiguous statutes,
and the question is whether the court will respect the view of the executive or
instead rule in the way indicated by the comity doctrines. If Congress seeks to
resolve the question, it is entitled to do exactly that under Chevron Step One.
To be sure, it might be tempting to read the argument for executive power to
suggest a kind of clear statement principle; perhaps that principle would be
constitutionally inspired in some domains, such as the suggestion that
Congress should not lightly be taken to intrude on the President's inherent
power to settle important questions of foreign relations.183 When the President
does have a legitimate claim to such power, there is indeed reason for a clear
statement principle, justified by reference to the avoidance canon. But the
argument we have made is limited to cases of real ambiguity, in which there is
no claim of inherent constitutional power and the question is whether to follow
the views of the executive or instead one or another comity principle.
It follows that our argument does not bear on cases in which the executive
asks a court to ignore a clear statute because of its foreign relations implications
in situations in which the executive's view is clearly at odds with that of
Congress. A subset of such cases includes high-profile conflicts between the
182. For more detailed discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National
Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2oo6 Sup. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
183-. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting the apparent clear statement principle in
Jama).
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executive and Congress, as when the executive seizes steel mills in the absence
of congressional authorization, 84 sends troops to war in violation of a statute
that restricts the use of troops without congressional approval,'8 5 or engages in
espionage in apparent conflict with existing statutes.'86 Courts sometimes
resolve these cases by determining which branch has the constitutional
authority to act; at other times, they avoid resolving these cases on justiciability
grounds. 8 7 In this Article, we do not express an opinion on these longstanding
disputes. Our focus, involving problems that are less sensational but far more
important to the ordinary operation of federal law, is on statutes that are
ambiguous rather than clear, which is the standard domain of the international
relations doctrines.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have attempted to understand the international relations
doctrines and to explore the role of the executive in interpreting ambiguous
statutes that might be taken to be inconsistent with those doctrines. In our
view, the doctrines reflect not a concern about entanglement alone but a rough
consequentialist judgment on the part of the federal courts, to the effect that
the risks to American interests outweigh the potential benefits. Courts believe,
for example, that a violation of international law is not likely to be in the
interest of the United States, and thus they construe ambiguous statutes so as
not to produce violations of international law. The same assessment underlies
the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. It is for this
reason that clear congressional authorization is required to threaten
international comity.
The obvious problem is that courts are not institutionally well equipped to
make the relevant judgments. When the governing statute is vague or
ambiguous, there is no sufficient reason to forbid the executive to balance the
underlying interests as it chooses. By virtue of its knowledge and
accountability, the executive is in the best position to make the appropriate
consequentialist judgments -to assess the risks to American interests and the
184. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
185. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring)
(arguing that a challenge to the use of force under the War Powers Resolution is
nonjusticiable).
186. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Legal Rationale by Justice Dept. on Spying Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, atAl.
187. Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89, with Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24.
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value of, say, applying environmental and civil rights statutes outside of the
nation's borders. As a matter of constitutional structure, moreover, the
President has a distinctive role in this domain. It follows that courts should
defer to executive interpretations of ambiguous enactments. Deference of this
kind would greatly simplify the relevant inquiries; it would also ensure that the
relevant judgments are made by those who are best suited to make them.
If this approach were adopted, the executive would have greater power to
interpret statutory ambiguities in the domain of foreign affairs. The most
serious objection to this result is that it would unduly concentrate power in the
executive branch. There are three responses to this objection. First, nothing
said here excludes the possibility that Congress is entitled to the last word;
under Chevron Step One, clear legislation is controlling. Second, a grant of
authority to the executive may well result in a more expansive use of rights-
protecting provisions in American law; recall that under our approach, the
executive is permitted to apply U.S. antidiscrimination laws to American
companies operating abroad. Third, other canons of interpretation, most
notably constitutional avoidance, operate as a check on executive authority. We
have emphasized that under conventional principles, the legislature must
unambiguously authorize the executive to intrude into the domain of
constitutionally sensitive rights, such as the right to a fair hearing or the right
to freedom of speech.
With these qualifications, the grant of interpretive discretion to the
executive emerges as a sensible recognition of the inevitable role that
judgments of policy and principle play in resolving statutory ambiguities -and
of the advantages of ensuring that those judgments are made by those who
have relevant information and democratic accountability.
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